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Abstract
In ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,’ David Lewis says that he
is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to
understand objective chance.” The present paper aims to motivate this
same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with
respect to objective causation.
The paper begins with Newcomb problems, which turn on an apparent
tension between two principles of choice: roughly, a principle sensitive
to the causal features of the relevant situation, and a principle sensitive
only to evidential factors. Two-boxers give priority to causal beliefs, and
one-boxers to evidential beliefs. I note that a similar issue can arise when
the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case,
the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by
chances, and rules based on credences guided by other sorts of probabilistic
evidence. Far from excluding cases of the latter kind, Lewis’s Principal
Principle explicitly allows for them, in the form of the caveat that credences
should only follow beliefs about chances in the absence of “inadmissible
evidence”.
I then exhibit a tension in Lewis’s views on these two matters, by pre-
senting a class of decision problems – some of them themselves Newcomb
problems – in which Lewis’s view of the relevance of inadmissible evidence
seems in tension with his causal decision theory. I offer a diagnosis for this
dilemma, and propose a remedy, based on an extension of a proposal due
to Ned Hall and others from the case of chance to that of causation.
The remedy suggests a new view of the relation between causal de-
cision theory and evidential decision theory, viz., that they stand to each
other much as chance stands to credence, being objective and subjective
faces of the same practical coin. This has much the same metaphysical
benefits as Lewis’s own view of chance, and also throws interesting new
light on Newcomb problems, providing an irenic resolution of the apparent
disagreement between causal and evidential decision rules.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary metaphysicians are familiar with the claim that an adequate
account of chance, or objective probability in general, needs to attend to the sub-
jective face of probability, too. That is, it needs to make sense of the link between
chance, on the one hand, and credence, on the other. The classic expression of
this viewpoint is to be found in David Lewis’s ‘A subjectivist’s guide to objec-
tive chance.’1 (Lewis, 1980) Lewis’s “Principal Principle,” introduced in that
paper, aims to formalize this connection between the objective and subjective
faces of probability, by characterizing the constraint that knowledge of chance
properly imposes on rational credence.
Lewis himself takes it to be definitive of chance that it plays this role in
guiding credence, or subjective probability. “Indeed,” as he puts it, he is “led
to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand
objective chance!” (1980, 84) Returning to this theme in later work, he criticizes
rival approaches on the grounds that they pay insufficient attention to this con-
nection between chance and credence: “Don’t call any alleged feature of reality
‘chance’ unless you’ve already shown that you have something, knowledge of
which could constrain rational credence,” he says. (1994, 484)
In this paper, I want to propose an analogous view of causation. To para-
phrase Lewis, I want to make it seem reasonable to wonder whether anyone
but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective causation. I also want
to show that there is a tension in Lewis’s views, in the light of the fact that he
endorses this degree of subjectivism for chance but not for causation.
At first sight, it is far from clear that there is a conceptual space for a proposal
of this kind. In particular, it is unclear what could comprise the subjective face
of objective causation. In the case of chance, the notion of credence, and its
relation to rational action, seem relatively unproblematic. They come as a
package, as Lewis himself notes:
There is no great puzzle about why credence should be a guide to life.
Roughly speaking, what makes it be so that a certain credence function is
your credence function is the very fact that you are disposed to act in more
or less the ways that it rationalizes. . . . No wonder your credence function
tends to guide your life. If its doing so did not accord to some considerable
extent with your dispositions to act, then it would not be your credence
function. You would have some other credence function, or none. (1980,
108–109)
Thus we might say that credence is defined in terms of its role in a subjective
decision theory (SDT) of the kind we have from Savage (1954); and that because
that part of the story is unproblematic, we are then free to characterise chance
in terms of credence, as Lewis proposes.
In the case of causation, however, we seem to lack an uncontroversial ana-
logue of SDT. On the contrary, subjectivist evidential decision theory (EDT),
such as that of Jeffrey (1965) – though initially motivated by the desire to ex-
tend Savage’s SDT to the case in which outcomes may depend on an agent’s
1As Lewis (1980, 83) notes, his view has affinities in this respect with that of Mellor (1971).
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choices – is widely held to deliver irrational recommendations in certain cases,
such as Newcomb problems. Many writers, including Lewis himself, believe
that EDT therefore needs to be supplanted, or at least supplemented, by a
causal decision theory (CDT) – which, these writers claim, does give the right
prescription in the difficult cases. Other writers disagree, and argue that EDT
does give the correct recommendations, in the cases in question.2 But both
sides accept that there is a substantial difference: that the relations of causal de-
pendence invoked by CDT simply differ, in the crucial cases, from the relations
of evidential dependence invoked EDT. From both sides of the dispute, then,
there seems to be no scope for the possibility that causal dependence might
align with subjective evidential dependence – that the latter might comprise
the subjective face of the former, as we put it above – in the way that Lewis
takes chance to align with credence.
My main goal in this paper is to show that both sides are mistaken. The
subjectivist option exists in the case of causation, just as for chance, and has
similar metaphysical advantages. In particular, it easily explains of the practical
relevance of the modal facts in question – facts about chance in Lewis’s case,
about causation in mine – where less subjectivist approaches have trouble. (It
is in this sense that, echoing Lewis, I think it is reasonable to wonder whether
anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective causation.)
The subjectivist option also throws interesting new light on the dispute
between EDT and CDT, suggesting a resolution of a decades-old stalemate at
the heart of that debate. I provide a brief introduction to this dispute, along
with other preliminaries, in the next section. (Readers unfamiliar with this
literature may safely skip the remainder of this section.) But to flag my course
for those who do know the territory, it will be to argue that both sides in the
dispute between EDT and CDT have missed an irenic proposal, that brings the
two decision theories into sufficient proximity to allow a subjectivist analogue
of the case of chance and credence. What is the secret of this irenic solution?
In a sense, simply the subjectivist proposal itself. By treating it as definitive
of causation that causal beliefs rationally constrain the conditional credences
needed by EDT, we bring EDT and CDT into sufficient alignment so that they
can be seen as the subjective and objective faces of the same practical coin (just
as credence and chance are, in Lewis’s own account).
For the moment, this suggestion is likely to strike experts on both sides of
the EDT/CDT dispute as little more than a verbal trick – a proposal simply to
change what we mean by the term causation, in effect. Surely – they will object
– the differences between CDT and EDT will still be as stark as ever, whatever
we call the decision theories in question? Changing the labels isn’t going to
change irrational acts into rational acts, or vice versa! So I have a lot of work to
do, to establish that there is an option here worth taking seriously.
Lewis’s views on chance and credence will provide a crucial point of refer-
ence, throughout the paper. They also provide a point of entry, in the following
sense. As I noted, I will be arguing that in Lewis’s own case, there is a signif-
2Readers unfamiliar with these issues will find a brief overview in §2 below.
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icant dissonance between his views of chance on the one hand and causation
on the other, consisting in the fact that he is more subjectivist about the for-
mer than the latter. Interestingly, this dissonance shows up in a sharp form
in his views about decision theory, if we compare his recommendations about
Newcomb problems, on the one hand, and certain exclusions to the Principal
Principle, on the other. The Principal Principle describes the way in which
rational credence tracks an agent’s beliefs about objective chance, in all normal
circumstances. But Lewis explicitly allows that there might be abnormal circum-
stances, in which agents take themselves to have what he calls “inadmissible
information” – the kind of direct epistemic access to the outcomes of chance
processes traditionally associated with seers, crystal balls, and the like.3 Lewis
takes it for granted that if we believe that we have such information, it overrules
the Principal Principle, in determining our rational credences. (Again, readers
unfamiliar with this discussion will find some more details in the next section.)
But as I shall show, this recommendation turns out to be in tension with Lewis’s
opposition to EDT, in certain Newcomb-like problems.
This tension in Lewis’s views about decision theory is of some interest in
its own right. Here, however, it functions as a path into the broader concerns
of the paper, and a motivation for my main proposal. I suggest a remedy
for the tension that rests on extending to the case of causation a suggestion
that Ned Hall makes for chance, in his own discussion of Lewis’s Principal
Principle. Roughly, Hall’s suggestion is that we make all evidence admissible
by stipulation. Cases of crystal balls thus become cases in which the chances are
weird, not cases in which rational credence ignores chance, in some weird way.
My proposal is that we say the same about causation in Newcomb problems:
they are cases in which causation is strange, not cases in which causal and
evidential dependence come apart in a strange way. When properly fleshed-
out (and defended against various objections), this proposal injects the required
element of subjectivism into our understanding of causation, and hence leads
to the view that I want to offer as an analogue of Lewis’s own view of chance.
As I said, my main goal is to get this modestly subjectivist account of causa-
tion into view. I take the fact that it is at present comparatively invisible to be
a significant failing in contemporary metaphysics. But there are other benefits,
besides those of an improved understanding of the metaphysical landscape.
Injecting an element of subjectivism into our understanding of causation turns
out to throw interesting new light on the cases on Newcomb problems and
their cousins. By taking a cue from Lewis’s account of chance, in other words,
we achieve a view of causation which not only has virtues analogous to those
of his own view of chance – e.g., in not leaving it mysterious why such facts
should matter to us, in the way that they do – but also offers a resolution of
some of the deepest puzzles that have plagued decision theory over the past
forty years.
3In my view, in fact, Newcomb problems come out as special cases of inadmissible evidence –
cases in which the information is conditional on Acts.
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2 Preliminaries
The paper covers a lot of ground, and I want to begin by making explicit two
simplifying assumptions – two issues that I am simply going to set aside, to
avoid further complexity in what is already an intricate discussion. First, it
might be argued that my subjectivist proposal would be better couched in
terms of counterfactual conditionals, rather than causation; the former being
the more basic notion, perhaps. I shall take no stand on this issue. Except at
one or two points where I engage with an argument already cast in terms of
counterfactuals, I’ll simply talk of “causation”, for convenience, on the grounds
that it is the term in common use in the decision theory literature. I think
that much of the rest of the discussion could be readily rephrased in terms of
counterfactuals, but I won’t try to defend that claim.
Second, and I think relatedly, I shall ignore the question as to whether
the proper subject-matter of the kind of account I want to put on the map is
causation itself – a relation in the world, as it were – or something like our
concept of causation (or our use of the term “causation”, perhaps). These are
very good questions, and are certainly not unconnected to the question as to
whether the accounts in question benefit from an injection of subjectivism. But
for present purposes it will be easier to set them aside; relying on the hope that
however they are best resolved, it will not spoil the analogy between causation
and chance, on which much of what follows depends.
In the remainder of this section I offer a brief overview of the Newcomb
problem and the debate it gives rise to between EDT and CDT; and then a
guide to the structure of the remainder of the paper.
2.1 Two decision rules
The original Newcomb problem goes something like this. God offers you
the contents of an opaque box. Next to the opaque box is a transparent box
containing $1,000. God says, “Take that money, too, if you wish. But I should
tell you that it was Satan who chose what to put in the opaque box. His rule
is to put in $1,000,000 if he predicted that you wouldn’t take the extra $1,000,
and nothing if he predicted that you would take it. He gets it right about 99%
of the time.”
Famously, this problem brings to a head a conflict between two decision
rules. In the Nozick’s original presentation of the puzzle (Nozick, 1969), these
rules were taken to be Dominance and Maximise Expected Utility. Intuitively,
Dominance says that if an action A is guaranteed to leave you no worse off than
action B, and may leave you better off; and if the choice between A and B makes
no difference to those factors in the world that determine your payoff; then A
should be preferred to B. For example, if you are offered a choice between two
ways of betting on a fair coin, one of which offers the same payout as the other
in the case of Heads but a higher payout in the case of Tails, then that’s the
one you should choose. (That choice dominates the other choice, as decision
theorists say.)
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Similarly in the Newcomb problem, apparently. Choosing two boxes leaves
you $1, 000 richer than choosing just the opaque box, whatever the opaque box
contains. And your choice seems to make no difference to whether the opaque
box contains money, because that is already determined, before you choose. So
Dominance seems to recommend that you take both boxes.
The second principle, Maximise Expected Utility (MEU), recommends that
you make your choice by considering a weighted average of the possible payoffs
of each of your possible actions, where the individual payoffs are each weighted
by the probability that that’s the payoff you will receive, given that you perform
the action concerned. This weighted average is called the expected utility of the
action in question, and MEU simply instructs you to choose the action with the
highest expected utility.
Opaque box empty Opaque box full
Take one box $0 (0.01) $1,000,000 (0.99)
Take both boxes $1,000 (0.99) $1,001,000 (0.01)
Table 1: The standard Newcomb problem, with evidential probabilities.
In the Newcomb case, using the probabilities shown in Table 1, the calcula-
tion thus goes like this. For choosing just the opaque box, the expected utility
is:
$0× P($0 in opaque box|One-box) + $1m× P($1m in opaque box|One-box)
Substituting the probabilities from Table 1, this gives us:
$0× 0.01 + $1m× 0.99 = $990,000.
In a similar way, we see that the expected utility for choosing two boxes is:
$1,000× 0.99 + $1,001,000× 0.01 = $11,000.
So, in contrast to Dominance, MEU recommends taking only the opaque box.
The puzzle of the Newcomb problem is that it presents us with a stark conflict
between these two decision principles, each of which has considerable intuitive
plausibility, in the case in question.
Later writers often present the Newcomb problem not as a clash between
Dominance and MEU, but rather as a disagreement between two different
ways of calculating expected utility (and hence between two different versions
of MEU). Thought of in this way, the difference turns on the nature of the
probabilities used as weights in the calculation. The first option thinks of
probability epistemically. In the cases in question, it measures the degree to
which the occurrence of a particular action A would provide evidence for the
occurrence of a given outcome O – in other words, as it is often put, the “news-
bearing” significance of A with respect to O.
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This notion of probability gives us what we can call evidentially-grounded
expected utility (“V-utility”, as it is often called in the literature):
V(Ai) = Σ jV(O j)Pevidential(O j|Ai).
Here {O j} and {Ai} are the relevant sets of Outcomes and Acts, respectively.
The second notion of expected utility relies on what, following Joyce (1999),
we may call the “causal probability” for an outcome given an action. Joyce
notes that while this notion “has been interpreted in a variety of ways in
the literature, . . . the common ground among causal decision theorists is that
[it] should reflect a decision maker’s judgements about her ability to causally
influence events in the world by doing A.” (1999, 161) Intuitively, the intent is
that Pcausal(O j|Ai) , Pcausal(O j) only if O j is causally dependent on Ai (positively
or negatively, as the case may be). This notion of probability gives us what we
can call Causally-grounded expected utility (or “U-utility”, as it is known):
U(Ai) = Σ jV(O j)Pcausal(O j|Ai)
These two notions of expected utility then give us two decision rules: Max-
imise V-utility, and Maximise U-utility. And it is a simple matter to show
that in the decision problem described above, these two rules seem to give
different recommendations. By the calculation we have already performed,
V(One-box) = $990,000, while V(Two-box) = $11,000. So the rule Maximise
V-utility recommends taking only the opaque box.
On the other hand, so long as we assume that the choice of one or both
boxes does not causally influence the contents of the boxes, then
Pcausal($0 in opaque box|One-box) = Pcausal($0 in opaque box|Two-box)
It follows immediately that
U(Two-box) = $1,000× α+ $1,001,000× (1− α)
= $1,000× α+ $1,000× (1− α) + $1,000,000× (1− α)
= $1,000 + ($0× α+ $1,000,000× (1− α))
= $1,000 + U(One-box),
where α = Pcausal($0 in opaque box|One-box) = Pcausal($0 in opaque box|Two-box).
So the rule Maximise U-utility recommends taking both boxes: the expected
U-utility of taking two boxes is $1,000 greater than that of taking one box.
Philosophers disagree about which of these two decision rules provides the
rational strategy in such a case. Among famous “two-boxers”, or “Causalists”,
is Lewis himself, who describes the issue as follows:
Some think that in (a suitable version of) Newcomb’s problem, it is rational
to take only one box. These one-boxers think of the situation as a choice
between a million and a thousand. They are convinced by indicative condi-
tionals: if I take one box I will be a millionaire, but if I take both boxes I will
6
not. Their conception of rationality may be called V-rationality; they deem
it rational to maximize V, that being a kind of expected utility defined in
entirely non-causal terms. Their decision theory is that of Jeffrey [(1965)].
Others, and I for one, think it rational to take both boxes. We two-
boxers think that whether the million already awaits us or not, we have no
choice between taking it and leaving it. We are convinced by counterfactual
conditionals: If I took only one box, I would be poorer by a thousand than
I will be after taking both. . . . Our conception of rationality is U-rationality;
we favor maximizing U, a kind of expected utility defined in terms of causal
dependence as well as credence and value. Our decision theory is that of
Gibbard and Harper [(1978)] or something similar. (Lewis 1981b, 377)
Elsewhere, Lewis affirms his commitment to two-boxing like this:
[S]ome—I, for one—who discuss Newcomb’s Problem think it is rational
to take the thousand no matter how reliable the predictive process may be.
Our reason is that one thereby gets a thousand more than he would if he
declined, since he would get his million or not regardless of whether he
took his thousand. (Lewis 1979, 240)
In the terminology introduced in the previous section, Lewis thus declares
himself to favour CDT (causal decision theory) rather than EDT (evidential
decision theory). However, he also remarks that the debate is “hopelessly
deadlocked.” (Lewis 1981a, 5) As he puts it in another paper:
[I]t’s a standoff. We [two-boxers] may consistently go on thinking that it
proves nothing that the one-boxers are richly pre-rewarded and we are not.
But [one-boxers] may consistently go on thinking otherwise. (1981b, 378)
In my view, one of the attractions of the proposal offered in the present pa-
per is that it promises to end this standoff, by showing us how to bring to-
gether the seemingly conflicting intuitions of Causalists and Evidentialists (i.e.,
two-boxers and one-boxers). Briefly, this compromise agrees with traditional
Evidentialists in the most “supernatural” versions of the standard Newcomb
problem – it recommends one-boxing in those cases, in other words, backing
up the recommendation with a new reply to the traditional Causalists’ main
objection to one-boxing. (Here, especially, the subjectivist option plays a crucial
role.) But it agrees with traditional Causalists in more realistic Newcomb-like
cases, explaining why Evidentialists should follow suit. It also proposes and
motivates a criterion for deciding on which side of the line a particular decision
problem lies.
2.2 Preview
As I noted, my route to this irenic proposal will begin with an apparent conflict
in Lewis’s own views about decision theory – a tension between his advocacy
of CDT, on the one hand, and his professed position concerning chance, evi-
dence and rational credence, on the other. The tension stems from the fact that
in his discussion of the Principal Principle, Lewis allows that chance does not
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provide an exceptionless constraint on rational credence: on the contrary, he
holds that an agent who believes that she has what Lewis terms “inadmissible
information” – i.e., direct epistemic access to the outcomes of chance processes –
may be rational to allow her credences to be guided by that information, rather
than by her knowledge of the relevant objective chances. I shall argue that this
amounts to recommending EDT rather than CDT, in a particular class of deci-
sion problems. Some of these problems are themselves Newcomb problems,
and in these cases, Lewis’s view of the relevance of inadmissible information
seems literally to support one-boxing, rather than two-boxing.4
I shall suggest a resolution of this tension, which rests on extending a pro-
posal by Ned Hall concerning the Principal Principle. Hall argues that Lewis’s
qualification of the Principal Principle to deal with inadmissible information is
unnecessary and undesirable. Better, he argues, to say that there is no such thing
as inadmissible information: properly understood, chance relates to rational
credence in such a way that such cases simply don’t arise.
I shall point out that this move is analogous to a view of causation that
has occasionally been found attractive in standard Newcomb cases, viz., the
claim that where evidential reasoning really does recommend one-boxing, so
too does causal reasoning, properly understood.5 This view thus interprets
causation in such a way that CDT and EDT make the same recommendations,
even in Newcomb cases. I propose that this approach be seen as arguing that
causation is an “expert function” for a deliberating agent, in much the way that
Hall treats chance as an expert function for a betting agent – an evidential agent,
in both cases.6
In the case of chance, the expert function’s outputs are prescriptions for
credences. In the case of causation, according to my proposal, the outputs
are prescriptions for the conditional credences of Outcomes given Acts, as
required by an agent who acts in accordance with EDT. I shall call these agentive
conditional credences, or agentive conditional probabilities. As we shall see, the
label “agentive” does triple duty: it marks the fact that these are probabilities
an agent needs, according to EDT; the fact that they are probabilities conditional
on acts; and, crucially, the fact that they are assessed from the agent’s distinctive
epistemic perspective.7 My proposal is thus that causal dependence stands to
4As we shall see, Lewis himself was certainly aware of the class of decision problems in question.
He qualifies his own version of CDT by stipulating that it is not intended to apply to them. But if I
am right that these cases include a particular class of Newcomb problems – a class in which Lewis’s
own views on the relevance of inadmissible evidence recommend one-boxing – then excluding
them by fiat from CDT is hardly a satisfactory solution, from a two-boxer’s point of view. It
amounts to withdrawing from the field, in some of the cases in which the conflict with EDT matters
most.
5See, e.g., Price (1991, 1993) for a view of this kind.
6In both cases, the significance of the “expert” metaphor is to flag the fact that according to the
views in question, it is definitive of the modal notions in question (chance or causation) that they
“can’t be wrong” about the corresponding evidential matters. In other words, the cash value of
the metaphor lies in the fact just noted about Hall’s view, that it says that there can no such thing
as inadmissible evidence: the cases Lewis treats as such are simply cases in which the chances are
not what they seem, according to Hall’s proposal.
7To forestall a possible concern, let me note at this point that the significance of taking these
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agentive conditional credence just as chance stands to credence according to
Hall’s proposal.
Hall’s view of how chance stands to credence is very close to Lewis’s own,
of course. They differ, essentially, only in their treatment of cases of inad-
missible evidence (Hall simply disallows it). Similarly for causation, I think.
Someone sympathetic to the analogy I wish to draw might nevertheless pre-
fer an analogue of Lewisean chance to an analogue of Hallean chance, in the
case of causation. That is, it is compatible with the view that these modal no-
tions (chance and causation) are both experts, first and foremost, that we might
have grounds (from physics, perhaps) to prefer a conception of the modal facts
which allows they may in principle float free of rational agency, in unusual
cases. Exceptional cases, by their very nature, force us to make a trade-off be-
tween accuracy and conceptual tidiness. Lewis’s picture of chance is tidier than
Hall’s, but pays for it by having to admit exceptions to the Principal Principle,
in some (very) unusual cases.
This trade-off needs to be negotiated for causation, too, according to my
proposal. In this case, the unusual cases are Newcomb problems.8 Note that in
the case of chance, our ranking of tidiness versus accuracy does not affect our
judgements about rational credence and rational action. Hall and Lewis agree
what credences are rational, in the presence of what Lewis calls inadmissible
evidence; even though they disagree about whether the chances are such that
these credences follow from the Principal Principle (properly formulated) itself.
Similarly for causation, I shall argue. A preference for accuracy yields a view
of causation such that CDT recommends one-boxing in the standard Newcomb
problem. A preference for tidiness yields the verdict that Newcomb problems
are strange cases in which causal beliefs and rational decision behaviour do not
keep step. But the rational policy is to one-box, in either case.
In my view, much of the force of the Newcomb puzzle derives from the fact
that we have allowed our modal and evidential notions to drift apart in this
way, without being aware of the diagnosis. Once we understand these facts,
we can either eliminate these cases altogether, via Hall’s prescription and its
causal analogue, or we can choose to live with them. But in the latter case the
right option is the one that Lewis himself grasped for chance: rationality and
modal metaphysics part company, and the rational choice is to one-box.
I stress again that although my proposal is motivated by an apparent tension
in Lewis’s views, and disagrees with Lewis about the rational policy in the clas-
sic Newcomb problem, it is in other respects Lewisean in spirit. In particular, it
probabilities to be assessed from the agent’s distinctive epistemic perspective will not be to open
the door to wholesale relativism, grounded in the fact that different agents have different evidence.
On the contrary, I take it that in this respect, agentive probabilities can be objectified in familiar
ways. Rather it reflects the familiar claim that agents have a distinctive epistemic attitude to their
own actions – the fact that “deliberation crowds out prediction,” as I will put it later (§8.1), borrowing
a phrase from Rabinowicz (2002).
8More precisely, they are some of the various decision puzzles called Newcomb problems; includ-
ing the classic Predictor case described above, under at least some of its possible disambiguations.
I shall have more to say later (§§6, 8, 9) about other cases, such as the more realistic “medical”
Newcomb problems, and other versions of the Predictor case.
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aims to extend to causation the well-judged balance between subjectivism and
objectivism, or pragmatism and metaphysics, that Lewis himself offers us in
the case of chance. That extension is the main project of this paper.
3 A chancy Newcomb problem?
On the face of it, Newcomb problems turn on a conflict between causal beliefs
and evidential beliefs. As above, judgements of causal dependence of outcomes
on acts support one sort of calculation of expected utility (“U-utility”). Judge-
ments of evidential dependence of outcomes on acts support another sort of
calculation of expected utility (“V-utility”). And Newcomb problems are cases
in which these two calculations give different values of expected utility; and
hence different recommendations for action, if we attempt to maximise our ex-
pected utility.
It is natural to ask whether the same kind of conflict between modal beliefs
and evidential beliefs can arise for other kinds of objective modality. Can it
arise for chance, for example? It is easy to see that it can, at least on some
intuitive understandings of chance. Suppose God offers you the payoffs shown
in Table 2 on a bet on the outcome of a toss of a fair coin. It is a good bet either
way, obviously, but a better bet on Heads than on Tails.
Heads Tails
Bet Heads $100 $0
Bet Tails $0 $50
Table 2: A free lunch?
Now suppose that Satan informs you that although God told you the truth,
and nothing but the truth, about the coin – in particular, it does have a 50%
chance of landing either Heads or Tails – He didn’t tell you the whole truth. So
far, this revelation shouldn’t impress you. You were well aware that – as in the
case of any event governed by (non-extreme) chances – there is a further truth
about the actual outcome of the coin toss, not entailed by knowledge of the
chances. “Tell me something I didn’t know,” you think to yourself.
“Okay,” responds Satan, rising to this silent bait, “I bet you didn’t know this:
on those actual future occasions on which you yourself bet on the coin, it comes
up Tails about 99% of the time. (On other occasions, it is about 50% Tails.)”
What strategy is rational at this point? Should you assess your expected return
in the light of the objective chances? Or should you avail yourself of Satan’s
further information? Call this the chancy Newcomb problem, or Chewcomb
problem, for short.9
9At this stage, the justification for calling this a Newcomb problem is just that it presents us
with a case in which modal and evidential beliefs deliver conflicting recommendations for action,
in an unusual way. As we shall see, variants of it become Newcomb-like in additional respects.
10
Let me make explicit some assumptions about this example. The most
important are first, that the coin is (or, what really matters here, is believed to be)
genuinely chancy; and second, that Satan is a source of inadmissible evidence,
in Lewis’s sense – in other words, that Satan is, as Hall puts it, a “crystal ball.”
As Hall says:
Lewis himself notes (1986, 94) that there are possibilities (involving such
things as time travellers, seers, and circular spacetimes) in which the past
carries news from the future which, if known, breaks the connection be-
tween credence and chance. When the past does carry such news, I will say
that it contains “crystal balls” (whether or not they take the form of magical
quartz). (Hall, 1994, 508)
Once again, as Hall himself notes, it doesn’t matter whether there really are any
crystal balls, only that our agents be assumed to have reasonable grounds for
thinking that there are:
There needn’t actually be crystal balls, there need only reasonably seem
to be. That is, a proposition E will be inadmissible at time t if it provides
reasonable warrant for a hypothesis that there are crystal balls (along with
information about what the balls say)—even if that hypothesis is false.
(Hall, 1994, 508)
The main role of these assumptions is to ensure that the present case is
the kind of case that writers such as Hall and Lewis himself had in mind, in
discussing chance and inadmissible evidence. Our use of the example is going
to be within the framework defined by those previous discussions, which means
that we can set aside certain concerns (e.g., perhaps, about the unrealistic nature
of the example) that would be shared by other cases within the framework.
Another concern, which I want to defer though not set aside completely, is
the thought that in the presence of a crystal ball yielding the evidence that Satan
provides, we might not be entitled to assume that the coin is still fair.10 We will
come back to this thought, which is related to Hall’s own prescription about
such cases. For the moment, I simply assume, following Lewis, that chance and
inadmissible evidence can come apart in this way, and that our game involves
an example of that phenomenon.
For future reference, let us also introduce a variant of the game, which makes
explicit that we have the option not to bet at all, and that any credences we
derive from Satan’s revelation are conditional in nature: they are conditional
on our choosing to bet. This gives us the two versions of the Chewcomb game,
Unconditional Chewcomb and Conditional Chewcomb, as shown in Table 3
and Table 4, respectively. (I hope it already seems plausible that adding the No
Bet option makes no difference to the rational choice in the Chewcomb game.
Why decline a free lunch, after all, which is what we do if we choose not to bet?)
Finally, let us assume that we believe that we, or others relevantly similar to
10The mere fact of the assumed correlation between the result of the coin tosses and our own
behaviour does not undermine the claim that the coin is fair, of course. The world is full of unlikely
conjunctions. What is odd about this one is simply that it is known in advance.
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us, will play these games many times in the future, so that Satan’s information
concerns a large class of future cases.
What is the rational policy, in either version of the Chewcomb game? Pre-
sumably we should use our rational credences to calculate the expected values
of the available actions, but there are two views as to what the rational credences
are. According to one view, the rational credences are given to us by our knowl-
edge of the objective chances, in accordance with the Principal Principle. In this
case, Satan’s contribution makes no difference to the rational expected utility,
and we should bet Heads, as before. According to the other view, our rational
credence should take Satan’s additional information into account, in which case
(as it is easy to calculate), our rational expected return is $1 if we choose Heads
and $49.50 if we choose Tails (in both versions of the game).
Heads Tails
Bet Heads $100 (0.01) $0 (0.99)
Bet Tails $0 (0.01) $50 (0.99)
Table 3: Unconditional Chewcomb (with evidential probabilities)
Heads Tails
Bet Heads $100 (0.01) $0 (0.99)
Bet Tails $0 (0.01) $50 (0.99)
No bet $0 (0.5) $0 (0.5)
Table 4: Conditional Chewcomb (with evidential conditional probabilities)
Which policy should we choose? If we turn for guidance to the masters, we
find that Lewis’s discussion of the constraint that a theory of chance properly
places on rational credence – the discussion in which he formulates the Principal
Principle – seems initially to recommend the second policy in such a case.
What it explicitly recommends – the point of Lewis’s exclusion to the Principal
Principle for the case in which one take oneself to have inadmissible evidence
– is that in such a case one’s rational credences follow one’s beliefs about the
new evidence, rather than remaining constrained by one’s theory of chance. As
Lewis puts it, it would be an “obvious blunder” to take the Principal Principle
to dictate the following credence: “C(the coin will fall heads/it is fair and will
fall heads in 99 of the next 100 tosses) = 1/2.” (Lewis 1994, 485) So Lewis
takes it for granted that someone who has inadmissible evidence should base
their credences on that evidence, rather than on their beliefs about the relevant
chances. In the present case, then, this suggests that we should assess our
options in the Chewcomb problem simply by replacing credences based on
chances with credences based on the Satanic evidential probabilities.
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However, it is easy to configure the Chewcomb problem so that this rec-
ommendation is in tension with that of CDT. Lewis’s own (1981a) formulation
of CDT is based on a partition K = {K0, K1, . . . } of “dependency hypotheses”,
each of which specifies how what an agent cares about depends on what she
does. The expected U-utility of an act A is then calculated as a sum of the
values of each option allowed by this partition, weighted by the corresponding
unconditional probabilities:
U(A) = ΣiP(Ki)V(A&Ki).
Thus in a standard Newcomb problem, where it is specified that the agent
has no causal influence over the contents of the opaque box, the dependency
hypotheses may simply be taken to be:
K0: The opaque box is empty.
K1: The opaque box contains $1,000,000.
We then calculate the U-utilities as follows:
U(Two-box) = P(K0)V(Two-box & K0) + P(K1)V(Two-box & K1)
U(One-box) = P(K0)V(One-box & K0) + P(K1)V(One-box & K1).
The result is that U(Two-box) > U(One-box), by the kind of reasoning we used
to calculate U-utility in §2.1.
Concerning the probabilities P(K0) and P(K1), Lewis stresses that if CDT
is to remain distinct from EDT, we need to use our unconditional subjective
probabilities at this point, not probabilities conditional on action:
It is essential to define utility as we did using the unconditional credences
C(K) of dependency hypotheses, not their conditional credence C(K|A). If
the two differ, any difference expresses exactly that news-bearing aspect
of the options that we meant to suppress. Had we used the conditional
credences, we would have arrived at nothing different from V. (1981a, 12)
What should we take the dependency hypotheses to be, to apply this frame-
work to the Chewcomb problem? If we assume that because the outcome is the
result of a toss of fair coin, it is not causally influenced by the way we choose
to bet, then again the dependency hypotheses seem to take a simple form:
KH: The coin lands Heads
KT: The coin lands Tails.
As we shall see, Lewis’s own formulation of dependency hypotheses in such a
case is a little more complicated; but it produces the same results, for present
purposes, so for the moment we may work with this simpler alternative.
The next issue concerns the probabilities P(KH) and P(KT). As just noted,
Lewis stresses that we need to use unconditional probabilities at this point, if
CDT is to remain distinct from EDT. This means that if we set up the example
so that Satan’s inadmissible evidence yields unconditional probabilities, as in
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Unconditional Chewcomb (Table 3), Lewis can consistently allow that CDT
yields the recommendation to bet on Tails. But in Conditional Chewcomb
(Table 4), we specified that the information that we learn from Satan doesn’t
tell us that P(KH) = 0.01, for example, but only that P(KH |We bet) = 0.01. In this
case, Satan’s information certainly concerns a “news-bearing aspect” of the act
of choosing to bet rather than not to bet. Accordingly, Lewis’s CDT then seems
to require that we use P(KH) = P(KT) = 0.5 for calculating U(Bet H), U(Bet T)
and U(No bet), for there are no other unconditional probabilities available. The
upshot is that CDT recommends the first of the two policies we distinguished
above: it recommends betting on H, on the grounds (i) that H pays a higher
return, and (ii) that KH and KT are taken to be equally likely, in the only sense
this decision theory allows to be relevant.
Unconditional Conditional Problem for Lewis
Heads Heads Conflict with policy on inadmissible evidence
Tails Heads Implausible difference in recommendations
Tails Tails Conflict with CDT
Table 5: Two Chewcomb games – policies and problems.
We thus have two versions of the Chewcomb game, Conditional Chewcomb
and Unconditional Chewcomb, where the difference consists in the availability
of the No Bet option. The problem for Lewis takes the form of a trilemma (see
Table 5). If he recommends betting Heads in both cases, the Unconditional case
appears to be in violation of his own policy on the relevance of inadmissible
evidence. If he recommends Tails in both cases, the Conditional case appears
to be in violation of his own version of CDT. While if he recommends different
policies in each case, the difference itself seems implausible. After all, the case
has been set up so that it seems obvious that a rational agent will choose to bet –
it’s a free lunch. And the mixed case seems to yield different recommendations,
depending on whether the agent is allowed first to choose to bet and then to
choose which bet, or has to make both choices at the same time.11
3.1 Following Lewis more closely
I noted above that in applying Lewis’s CDT to the Chewcomb game, we used
a different choice of dependency hypotheses. When Lewis considers the for-
mulation of CDT in indeterministic worlds, he takes the relevant dependency
hypotheses to be counterfactual conditionals whose antecedents are the ac-
tions an agent is considering, and whose consequences are full specifications of
chances for relevant outcomes. In the Chewcomb game, these counterfactuals
take a simple form. In the Unconditional version of the game they are simply:
11As Arif Ahmed pointed out to me, this amounts to a violation of Independence. In the mixed
case, the agent prefers betting on Tails to betting on Heads if she does not have the option not to
bet at all, but betting on Heads to betting on Tails if she does have the latter option.
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Bet Tails  Ch(H) = Ch(T) = 0.5
Bet Heads  Ch(H) = Ch(T) = 0.5.
In the Conditional version of the game, where the agent has the option not to
bet, we need to add:
No Bet  Ch(H) = Ch(T) = 0.5.
Since the consequent is identical in all three cases, we may take the depen-
dency hypothesis to be simply a specification of the chances – i.e., in this case,
the proposition (FC) that the coin is fair. It follows that:
U(Bet Tails) = V(Bet Tails & FC)
U(Bet Heads) = V(Bet Heads & FC)
U(No Bet) = V(No Bet & FC).
How should we calculate the utilities on the right hand side of these expres-
sions? The first two expressions require a calculation of expected V-utility, and
here, once again, we face the issue of what probabilities we use in the calcula-
tion. If we simply use the chances, the option of betting Heads will maximise
U-utility. If we use the Satanic evidential probabilities, the option of betting
Tails will do so.
Once again, the problem is that both policies seem defensible, in Lewisean
terms. Lewis’s views on the relevance of inadmissible information seem to
recommend betting Tails. But in the Conditional game, this again has the effect
of making U-utility sensitive to “that news-bearing aspect of the options that
we meant to suppress” (as we saw that Lewis himself put it, in the case of the
weights on the dependency hypotheses).
3.2 Discussion
So, as I say, there seems to be a tension here, from Lewis’s point of view. I
offer the following diagnosis of the difficulty. Newcomb problems are decision
problems in which evidential policies seem to give different recommendations
from causal policies,12 and CDT is the decision theory that cleaves to the causal
side of the tracks. Cases of inadmissible evidence are cases in which chance-
based credences lead to different recommendations from (total-)evidence-based
credences, and Lewis takes it for granted that the rational policy is to cleave
to the evidential side of the tracks. Chewcomb problems introduce decision
problems in which both these things happen at once. It follows that the two
kinds of cleaving are liable to yield different recommendations in these cases.
At least, they are liable to do so as long as our causal judgements cleave to our
judgements about objective chance. But to give that up – to allow, instead, that
causal judgements might properly follow the “merely evidential” path – would
be to abolish the very distinction on which Newcomb problems rely (or at least
to move in that direction).
12Again, see §2.1 for an account of what this means.
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As I noted earlier, Lewis recognised that cases like the Chewcomb problem
lead to special difficulties. In the paper in which he presents his own version
of CDT, he compares it to several earlier proposals by other writers. One of
these proposals had been presented in unpublished work by Sobel, and Lewis’s
discussion of Sobel’s theory closes with the following remarks:
But [Sobel’s] reservations, which would carry over to our version, entirely
concern the extraordinary case of an agent who thinks he may somehow have
foreknowledge of the outcomes of chance processes. Sobel gives no reason, and I
know of none, to doubt either version of the thesis except in extraordinary
cases of that sort. Then if we assume the thesis, it seems that we are only
setting aside some very special cases – cases about which I, at least, have
no firm views. (I think them much more problematic for decision theory
than the Newcomb problems.) So far as the remaining cases are concerned,
it is satisfactory to introduce defined dependency hypotheses into Sobel’s
theory and thereby render it equivalent to mine. (Lewis, 1981a, 18, my
emphasis)
However, I don’t know whether Lewis saw the difficulty that these cases
pose for his own views – a difficulty that turns on a tension between his attitude
to the relation between causal judgements and evidential judgements, on the
one hand, and chance judgements and evidential judgements, on the other.13
In any case, the move of simply setting aside these cases can hardly be
regarded as satisfactory, by Lewis’s own lights. His own policy on inadmissible
evidence seems to yield a clear recommendation in the Unconditional version of
the game; and hence a clear recommendation in the Conditional case, too, given
the implausibility of the mixed strategy. We thus have a class of Newcomb-like
problems in which Lewis’s policy on inadmissible evidence concurs with EDT;
and in which CDT escapes defeat only by withdrawing from the field.14
4 Making the analogy closer
So far, our Chewcomb problems have been Newcomb-like in two respects. Even
the Unconditional version of the Chewcomb game is analogous to a Newcomb
problem, in that it provides a case in which modal beliefs and evidential beliefs
yield different recommendations.15 (The difference between Unconditional
13Lewis also notes the difficulty posed by these cases in correspondence with Wlodek Rabinowicz
in 1982, saying:
It seems to me completely unclear what conduct would be rational for an agent in
such a case. Maybe the very distinction between rational and irrational conduct
presupposes something that fails in the abnormal case. (Lewis, 1982: 2)
(I am grateful to Howard Sobel for alerting me to the existence of this correspondence, and to
Wlodek Rabinowicz, Stephanie Lewis and the Estate of David K. Lewis, for giving me access to it.)
14True, they are “extraordinary cases.” But so, too, is the classic Newcomb problem. Once CDT
has become fickle in this way, what reason do we have to trust it in that case?
15Note that the conditionals employed by EDT are indicatives, not counterfactuals – see, e.g.,
our first quotation from Lewis in §2.1 – so modality is not “snuck back in” on the evidential side.
(Thanks to a referee at this point.)
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Chewcomb and Newcomb is that the modality concerned is chance rather than
causality.) But the introduction of the Conditional game produced a decision
problem which is Newcomb-like in a more direct sense, namely, that it involves
an apparent conflict between CDT and evidential reasoning.16 In other words, it
brings the conflict to the causal side of the chance/causation line, as in standard
Newcomb problems.
On the face of it, we can go even further. We can produce a Chewcomb game
whose decision table looks exactly like that of the classic Newcomb problem.
Suppose that God offers you the contents of an opaque box, to be collected
tomorrow. He informs you that the box will then contain $0 if a fair coin to be
tossed at midnight lands Heads, and $1,000,000 if it lands Tails. Next to it is a
transparent box, containing $1,000. God says,“You can have that money, too,
if you like.” At this point Satan whispers in your ear, saying, ”It is definitely
a fair coin, but my crystal ball tells me that in 99% of future cases in which
people choose to one-box in this game, the coin actually lands Tails; and ditto
for two-boxing and Heads.”
As before, we assume that God and Satan are telling the truth. What
is the rational decision policy in this case? Here the evidential and causal
recommendations seem to be exactly as in the original Newcomb problem, as
described in §2.1. Your action will not have any causal influence on whether
there is money in the opaque box, apparently. How could it do so, when that
is determined by the result of a toss of a fair coin?17 But as Table 6 shows,
you take there to be a strong evidential correlation between your action and the
result of the coin toss, such that you are much more likely to get rich if you
one-box.
Heads Tails
Take one box $0 (0.01) $1,000,000 (0.99)
Take two boxes $1,000 (0.99) $1,001,000 (0.01)
Table 6: Boxy Chewcomb (with evidential conditional probabilities)
4.1 Remembering the counterfactuals
In this case there is no unconditional version of the game, to highlight the ten-
sion in Lewis’s position in the way that we did above. (The parallel with the
original Newcomb problem depends on the fact that the high evidential prob-
ability of money in the opaque box is conditional on the agent’s only choosing
that box.) Accordingly, two-boxers will feel their standard reply will suffice,
in this case. They will argue that whatever payout the one-boxer receives in
16Provided, at least, that the latter is understood in the light of Lewis’s policy on inadmissible
evidence.
17In the next section I propose an understanding of causation that challenges this claim, but for
the moment I am assuming that someone who says that the agent has no causal influence on the
contents of the opaque box in the standard Newcomb problem will be inclined to say the same
here.
17
Boxy Chewcomb (Table 6), it will always be true that had she two-boxed, she
would have received the same payout plus $1,000. Joyce, for example, puts the
general argument like this:
[H]aving gotten the $1,000,000, [the one-boxer] must believe that she would
have gotten it whatever she did, and thus that she would have done better
had she taken the $1,000. So, while she may feel superior to [the two-boxer]
for having won the million, [she] must admit that her choice was not a wise
one compared to her own alternatives. . . . [S]he made an irrational choice
that cost her $1,000. (Joyce 1999, 153)
The availability of this argument in the present case turns on the fact that
Boxy Chewcomb is crucially different from the original Conditional Chewcomb
game (Table 4), where no such appeal to counterfactuals is possible, by the
Causalist’s lights. In that case, an agent who bets Tails and wins cannot be told
that she would have won even more, had she bet Heads (or not bet at all): on
the contrary, presumably, she would have won nothing, in either case.
Accordingly, a Causalist might try to hold the line here – defending two-
boxing in Boxy Chewcomb – while conceding both the Conditional and Uncon-
ditional versions of the previous game to the Evidentialist. It would still need
to be explained how CDT can be formulated so as to follow EDT in Conditional
Chewcomb, without also endorsing one-boxing in Boxy Chewcomb, too. But
the counterfactuals associated with this response to the one-boxer seem to mark
a line at which a stand might be made.
However, I want to try to pre-empt this defensive strategy, by counterattack-
ing on what seems to two-boxers the safe side of the line. I think that Evidential-
ists typically concede too much to their Causalist opponents, in granting them
the counterfactuals on which the charge that one-boxing is irrational always
depends. The analogy with the case of chance and inadmissible evidence, and
a proposal made in that context by Ned Hall, together suggest a much more
forceful response.
5 One-boxing via the Hall way?
Hall (1994, 2004) recommends that we replace Lewis’s Principal Principle with
a modified principle, requiring that rational credences track conditional chances:
chances given our evidence. At first sight, this may seem to eliminate the problem
cases. What matters isn’t simply the chance of the coin coming up Tails, but the
chance of it doing so given the extra information that Satan has whispered in our
ear.18 On the face of it, then, this seems to be irenic resolution of the dilemma
posed by the Chewcomb problems: they are pseudo-problems, artifacts of a
mistaken rule for aligning credence with one’s beliefs about chance: in one sense
a victory for Evidentialism, but a face-saving victory for the Evidentialists’
opponents, too, in that it maintains that they never had any good reason to
disagree.
18Or the information that Satan has provided this information, perhaps.
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But things aren’t so simple. To see this, we only have to imagine a proponent
of a view of chance according to which it makes no difference what Satan
whispers in one’s ear: the real metaphysical chance of a fair coin’s landing Tails
is insensitive to such supernatural vocalisations (our objector insists), and so
the shift to conditional chances makes no difference. In such a case, it remains
an issue whether rational credence (conditional or otherwise) should be guided
by chance alone, or by other kinds of information.
I think that the real relevance of Hall’s treatment of the Principal Principle
to our present concerns lies not in the requirement that rational credences track
conditional chances, but in the fact that he proposes a view of chance which
makes it automatic that conditional chances are sensitive to such evidence.
Drawing on earlier proposals by Gaifman (1988) and van Fraassen (1989, 197–
201), Hall suggests that “chance plays the role of an expert”:
Why should chance guide credence? Because—as far as its epistemic role is
concerned—chance is like an expert in whose opinions about the world we
have complete confidence. (1994, 511)
In his (2004) paper Hall elaborates on this idea by distinguishing two kinds of
expert – roughly, the kind of expert (a “database-expert”, as Hall puts it) who
simply knows a lot, and
the kind of expert who earns that status not because she is so well-informed,
but rather because she is extremely good at evaluating the relevance (to claims
drawn from the given subject matter) of different possible bits of evidence.
(2004, 100)
“Let us call the second kind an analyst-expert,” Hall continues. ”[S]he earns
her epistemic status because she is particularly good at evaluating the relevance
of one proposition to another.” (2004, 100) Hall takes chance to be the second
kind of expert: “I claim that chance is an analyst-expert.” (2004, 101)
Thus for Hall it becomes a matter of definition that chance and reasonable
credence cannot come apart, once we have conditionalised on all our evidence;19
even if some of that evidence counts as “inadmissible,” by Lewis’s lights. And
it is this stipulation, rather than the conditionalisation move itself, that ensures
that there cannot be a genuine Chewcomb problem – a genuine case in which
chance and evidential reasoning come into conflict.
I’ve stressed this point because it is the latter aspect of Hall’s view – the view
that chance is an analyst-expert – that seems to me analogous to an attractive
resolution of the original Newcomb case. In Hall’s terminology, the resolution
turns on the proposal that causal dependence should be regarded as an analyst
expert about the conditional credences required by an evidential decision maker.
A little more formally, the proposal goes something like this:
B is causally dependent on A just in case an expert agent would take
P(B|A) , P(B), in a calculation of the V-utility of bringing it about that
A (in circumstances in which the agent is not indifferent to whether B).
19As I noted in fn. 6, this is the meat of the “expert” metaphor. Chance simply “can’t be wrong”
about rational credence, as it were.
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Since this suggestion takes it to be definitive of causal belief that its role is
to guide a particular kind of evidential judgement, I shall call it the EviCausalist
proposal. It may seem to fall victim very swiftly to some well-known coun-
terexamples – more on those in a moment. First, in its defence, let us note that it
is not merely an analogue of Hall’s proposal in the case of chance. It is something
close to a consequence of it, at least if we wish to retain the intuitive connection
between causing something, on the one hand, and raising the chances of it, on the
other. Consider our Boxy Chewcomb game (Table 6), for example. The original
argument for the causal independence of the outcome (Heads or Tails) on our
choice of one or two boxes was that in either case, the chance of Heads and
Tails remains the same. (How could we exert a causal influence, we reasoned,
if we couldn’t influence the chances of the outcomes concerned?) According to
Hall’s prescription, however, the conditional chance of Tails given one-boxing
is higher than conditional chance of Tails given two-boxing (and higher than
the conditional chance of Heads given one-boxing). And since we can choose
which antecedent to “actualise” in these various conditional chances, we can
also influence the resulting unconditional chance, in the obvious sense. Thus
the intuitive connection between chance and causation now suggests that we do
have causal dependence of Outcomes on Acts. By choosing to one-box rather
than two-box, we greatly increase the chance of Tails.
In effect, the EviCausalist proposal is simply that we should take seriously
in general the view of causal dependence that is thus forced on us in this par-
ticular case, if we wish to combine Hall’s view of chance with an intuitive
understanding of the relation between chance and causation. Comparing Table
1 and Table 6, it is easy to see that EviCausalism will treat the classic Newcomb
problem in just the same way as the Boxy Chewcomb problem. In other words,
it implies that the contents of the opaque box in the classic Newcomb problem
are causally dependent on the agent’s choice, in the sense of causal dependence
now proposed. Accordingly, the EviCausalist will regard the classic Newcomb
problem not as a case in which CDT and EDT come apart, but simply one
in which the causes are not what we initially assume. We might take this to
imply that it is not really a Newcomb problem at all, on the grounds that as
Joyce (1999, 152) puts it, “[i]t is part of the definition of a Newcomb problem
that the decision maker must believe that what she does will not affect what
the psychologist has predicted.” But this is a terminological matter, on a par
with that as to whether, in the light of Hall’s proposal, we want to continue to
speak of “inadmissible evidence.” The substantial point is that in the classic
(so-called) Newcomb problem, EviCausalism proposes an understanding of
the causal structure of the case such that CDT and EDT agree in recommending
one-boxing.
It is not news, of course, that CDT recommends one-boxing if the agent’s
choice affects what the Predictor puts in the boxes. Retrocausal variants of
the original Newcomb problem are familiar – they feature in Nozick’s (1969)
paper. What EviCausalism adds to this background is a proposal about the
nature of causal dependence itself, such that the Newcomb problem cannot
but be retrocausal, if there is genuine evidential dependence of the Predictor’s
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behaviour on the agent’s choice, from the agent’s point of view.20
As I remarked above, however, the EviCausalist proposal may seem an ob-
vious non-starter, blocked by familiar and ordinary “medical” cases, in which
it is (widely thought to be) clear that causal dependence and evidential depen-
dence do not align with one another, in the way that EviCausalism appears to
suggest. I turn to this objection in a moment. But before that, I want to stress
one more lesson to be drawn from the analogy with Hall’s view of chance. In
neither case, for chance or for causation, is Hall’s view or its causal analogue
the only game in town. In either case, we might have grounds to prefer a modal
notion that could drift apart from evidence, in unusual cases. I merely want
to claim that in this eventuality, once we recognise it for what it is, it should
seem clear that the rational choice goes with the evidence, not with the modal
notion.
As we have seen, this already looks unremarkable to us in the case of chance.
In that case, Lewis himself offers us a modal notion (chance) that can diverge
from evidence, in strange cases. He regards it as obvious that rational credence
follows the evidence, not the modal facts, in such exceptional cases. I am
proposing (and will be arguing) that this should seem just as unremarkable in
the case of causation.
6 A cigarette at bay?
Whatever the appeal of EviCausalism in Chewcomb cases, it may seem that
there are familiar Newcomb problems in which causal dependence and eviden-
tial dependence are clearly distinct. Consider the famous case of the Smoking
Gene, for example, in which an agent believes that there is a gene which pre-
disposes both to smoking and cancer, ensuring that these two outcomes are
positively correlated (see, e.g., Jeffrey 1981, 476–478). In general, the fact that
someone is a smoker thus indicates that she is more likely than otherwise to
have the gene, and hence more likely than otherwise to develop cancer. EDT is
therefore held to recommend that even if such an agent prefers smoking to not
smoking, other things being equal, she should decide not to smoke, in order to
minimise the evidential probability that she will develop cancer (and thereby
maximise her expected V-utility). But it would add idiocy to irrationality,
surely, to try to justify this recommendation by claiming that causation should
be understood in such a way that this agent can cause herself to lack the gene.
Indeed it would, and I make no such claim. Instead, I propose that in
these familiar cases, the agent is making a mistake – a mistaken probabilistic
inference, not a mistaken decision – if she concludes that her choice as to
whether to smoke is evidentially relevant to whether she carries the gene in
question, from her own point of view.
In support of the claim that this proposal is at least not obviously absurd,
I appeal first to the authority of some of my (traditional) Causalist opponents,
20And if the agent really has a choice in the matter, of course.
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who recognised long ago that Evidentialists could get fairly close to this claim.
Here is Brian Skyrms (1980, 130), for example: “There is a defense for [the
Evidentialist] which can be pushed very far, but not, I think, far enough.”
Skyrms is talking about what was then becoming known as the Tickle Defence:
an argument that in a case such as the Smoking Gene, an agent should indeed
regard her action as probabilistically independent of whether she carries the
gene. The essence of the Tickle Defence is the thought that if an agent’s rational
choice is to be influenced by a pre-existing physiological state, then in principle
that must be evident to her, in the configuration of her desires and beliefs.
Perhaps she simply feels a “tickle” (an urge to smoke), or perhaps it is more
subtle, but in principle she knows in advance; in which case, as all agree, this
knowledge screens off the evidential relevance of her choice to whether she
gets cancer.21
Lewis himself goes even further:
I [say] that the Tickle Defence does establish that a Newcomb problem
cannot arise for a fully rational agent, but that decision theory should not
be limited to apply only to the fully rational agents. Not so, at least, if
rationality is taken to include self-knowledge. May we not ask what choice
would be rational for the partly rational agent, and whether or not his partly
rational methods of decision will steer him correctly? (1981a, 10)
It seems to me that at least in hindsight, this assessment positively invites a
response framed in terms of expert functions. More about this in a moment,
but before that, a couple of preliminary points.
Obvious no longer
First, a remark on the relevance of the dialectic of these old discussions to the
present case. As noted, the acknowledged successes of the Tickle Defence do
much to meet the objection that there are cases in which it is obvious that my
proposed analogue of Hall’s suggestion will attribute causal dependency, where
actually there is none. These successes force the Evidentialist’s opponents to
retreat in one of two directions: either to less familiar and less realistic examples,
in which it is correspondingly less plausible to say that the causal structure is
not a matter for debate; or, as noted, to less rational agents, about whom
there is inevitably an issue about the nature of their irrationality. So long
as we Evidentialists can find an alternative interpretation to decision-theoretic
irrationality, these agents need not trouble us.
Both points are well made by Paul Horwich. Concerning the first, Horwich
notes that there are analogues of medical Newcomb problems that might evade
the Tickle Defence:
It is not difficult to concoct highly artificial examples in which, ex hypothesi,
there is no tickle, no screen, and therefore no argument for the convergence
21Skyrms says, “I have heard this defense independently from Frank Jackson, Richard Jeffrey,
David Lewis, and Isaac Levi.” (1980, 130) More recent versions of this argument include those of
Horgan (1981), Eells (1981, 1982, 1984), Horwich (1985) and Price (1986, 1991).
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of the evidential and causal principles. For example, we could simply have
stipulated that cancer be correlated with smoking . . . (1985, 435)
However, he continues
such scenarios do not constitute clear counterexamples to the evidential
principle because they are extremely unrealistic—in exactly the same way
as Newcomb’s problem itself—and cannot, therefore, provide the material
for authoritative intuitions. (1985, 435)
Later, taking up the Lewis’s objection that “decision theory should not be
limited to apply only to the fully rational agents,” Horwich makes the second
point. He points out that Lewis’s objection
neglects a certain systematic equivocation in the evaluation of actions. They
are always judged in relation to desires and beliefs which are themselves
susceptible to evaluation. Therefore, an act may be criticized as irrational
because it was based on irrational beliefs, even though it was correct relative
to those beliefs. (1985, 438)
We’ll return to this observation below, and amplify it with reference to the
analogy with chance and credence.
A causal shortcut to evidential virtue
Next, I want to call attention to an advantage of EviCausalism with respect to
medical Newcomb problems which is not shared by more orthodox versions
of Evidentialism (such as Horwich’s). Suppose, as the EviCausalist claims,
that information about causal dependencies just is expert information about
the corresponding evidential dependencies, from an agent’s point of view.
In the simplest case, in other words, the information that events of type A
are (positively) causally relevant to events of type B is the information that
rationality requires that an agent contemplating an action of type A should
take it to be positively evidentially relevant to the occurrence of an outcome of
type B.22 Then, at least in familiar and uncontroversial cases, such as that of
the Smoking Gene, an agent with a proper grasp of the causal concept and firm
beliefs about the causal structure of a particular case can no more be confused
about the evidential dependencies, than, according to Lewis, an agent with firm
beliefs about chance and a good understanding of the concept can be confused
about the associated credences. For causation as for chance, the EviCausalist
insists, confusion in uncontroversial cases is simply an indication that the agent
in question does not have a proper grasp of the concept.
Indeed, the EviCausalist can go further. Having interpreted causal informa-
tion in this evidential manner, she can allow that it is a considerable advantage
22Readers may baulk here at the subjectivism of this proposal. To paraphrase a referee, “Were
there no causal dependencies before there were agents?” Indeed there were, just as according to
Lewis there were chances before there were any creatures with credences. Nevertheless, Lewis
holds that we cannot properly characterise chance unless we do so in terms of credence – unless we
say, in effect, that information about chance is information about rational credence. The EviCausalist
says the same about causal dependence. (See also fn. 7, p. 8.)
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of CDT, in many cases, that it operates directly with this encoded form of ev-
idential information. Like computers programmers more comfortable in C++
than in machine code, ordinary agents find it much easier to operate at the
causal level of description – much easier, thereby, to avoid the perils of proba-
bilistic inference, a task which most of us are prone to get wrong.23
But this convenience comes with a cost. In unfamiliar circumstances, it may
seem to us that the causal facts and evidential facts pull in opposite directions. In
familiar cases, we rely on various associations between causal facts and other
features of situations – in other words, we take various criteria to be grounds
for ascribing or withholding causal claims (i.e., really, on this view, evidential
claims). But in unusual circumstances, these criteria can be a poor guide to the
evidential structure of the case in question. We are habituated to regarding them
as good guides to causal structure, and so it seems that causal and evidential
dependency are coming apart. But it is an illusion, generated by the mistaken
assumption that we were dealing with two distinct kinds of information in the
first place – by the fact that we have allowed the causal realm to take on a life
of its own, distinct from our evidential point of view.
Is CDT to EDT what chance is to credence?
Once again, the analogy with chance is helpful at this point. According to my
EviCausalist, causal dependence stands to the conditional subjective probabili-
ties needed by EDT, much as chance stands to the subjective probabilities, or
credences, required by decision makers whose rational behaviour is modelled
by an unconditional decision theory of Savage’s sort. Savage’s (1954) theory is
a subjective rational decision theory: it prescribes rational behaviour for agents
with a given set of credences and preferences, but remains silent about the
rationality of those credences and preferences themselves. The Principal Prin-
ciple steps into the latter gap (in the case of credence), imposing a rationality
constraint on credences, in the light of the agent’s beliefs about chances (or in
the light of the facts about chances, if we wish to interpret the Principal Principle
as an objective constraint on rational credence).
Note that in principle we could combine these two levels, formulating an
analogue of Savage’s theory directly in terms of beliefs or even facts about
chances.24 Why wouldn’t that be preferable? Well, because it would formalise
Horwich’s “systematic equivocation in the evaluation of actions,” for one thing;
and thereby, arguably (more on this in §7.1), obscure something very important
about the “subjective,” “pragmatic” or “practical” foundations of the concept of
chance itself – the sense in which the concept has its roots in subjective decision.
23This is not to say that we are not prone to make mistakes in causal reasoning, too, but simply
that it can be an advantage to package information in a way that puts its practical implications front
and centre, so that the recipients do not need to work them out on the fly. As a further analogy,
compare the information that the thing in the bushes is a large hungry carnivore with sharp claws,
with the information that the thing in the bushes is very dangerous. It is often helpful not to have to
go back to first principles.
24In the first case, we use the Principal Principle as our guide to the beliefs about chances
relevant for substitution for each of the subjective probabilities in SDT; in the second case, we
simply substitute chances directly for subjective probabilities.
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Let SDTch be such an “objective” version of Savage’s decision theory, for-
malised in terms of chances, and SDTev the familiar subjective version. The
EviCausalist regards the relation between CDT and EDT as closely analogous
to that between SDTch and SDTev. CDT is simply the “objectified” version of
EDT, which runs together two issues: the subjective issue of the rationality of
a decision policy, given certain preferences and conditional credences, and the
objective (or at least less subjective) issue of the rationality of certain conditional
credences – credences of outcomes given actions – given the facts, or the agent’s
beliefs, about causation. (CDT then has the analogous disadvantage to SDTch,
in that it obscures the practical, subjective roots of the concept of causation
itself, and invites Horwich’s “systematic equivocation.”)
Two dimensions of expertise
With all this in hand, let us return to Lewis’s remark that “decision theory
should not be limited to apply only to the fully rational agents.” Lewis is right,
of course, that (subjective) decision theory should not simply fall silent, in the
case of an agent whose beliefs and preferences are not fully rational. But this
is compatible with the insight that decision theory itself is supposed to be an
expert, and therefore intolerant of irrationality in decisions made on the basis of
those beliefs and preferences. Agents themselves may be irrational at this step,
but decision theory aims to codify the standard that rational agents are trying
to meet. So there is a sense in which decision theory does “apply only to the
fully rational agents.” Taken descriptively, it does not apply – at least not strictly
– to agents who are not fully rational in making decisions on the basis of their
credences and preferences. Taken prescriptively, it does tolerate irrationality;
but only in the acquisition of beliefs and preferences, not in its own domain.
Subjective decision theory is the expert we consult as we try to do the best
with the credences and preferences we actually possess. But to what experts do
we turn to avoid the kind of irrationality that decision theory itself tolerates?
That is, for help with the credences themselves? Hall has already given us
a large part of the answer, perhaps all of it. We need two experts: first, the
database-expert, who knows all the evidence that we ourselves would have,
under idealisation; and second, the analyst-expert, who knows what credences
to assign on the basis of that evidence.
However, in the cases for which we need Jeffrey’s subjective decision theory
rather than Savage’s – cases with conditional dependence of States and hence
of Outcomes on Acts – these two experts have a special job to do. They need to
collaborate to consider the special epistemic situation of the deliberating agent
– I will have more to say about what this special epistemic situation actually
involves in §8.1 – in order to determine the rational conditional credences of
States given potential Acts, from her point of view. Because the task involves
this collaboration, it will be helpful both for the two experts and for their
clientele to create a single shopfront, through which requests for guidance
may conveniently be channelled. The EviCausalist proposes that this expert
shopfront – the “Agency Guidance Agency,” perhaps – is causal dependence.
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6.1 Resuscitating the medical objections?
This program for aligning CDT and EDT would be undermined by a genuine
medical Newcomb problem – i.e., a realistic case in which it was clear that the
relevant causal dependencies really differed from the evidential dependencies,
from the agent’s point of view. With such a case in hand, critics could fairly
object that EviCausalism amounts, at best, simply to changing the meaning of
“causal dependence,” in a way that obscures the genuine difference between
CDT and EDT.
Realistic cases seem to be hard to find, however, and this is certainly good
news, from the EviCausalist’s point of view. But shouldn’t the EviCausalist
expect even better news? After all, if the EviCausalist wants to claim that
there is some sort of conceptual tie between causal dependence and agentive
evidential dependence, shouldn’t it be more than a contingent matter that there
are no cases in which these notions clearly diverge, in the way that the proposal
seeks to disallow?
In response to this challenge, I want first to emphasise, once again, that
EviCausalism need not claim that it offers the only acceptable understanding
of causal dependence. On the contrary, it should acknowledge that the notion
of causation has other conceptual ties, and – in a good Quinean spirit – allow
that the preservation of these ties might seem preferable, in some quarters,
when the concept comes under pressure for revision in strange cases.25 By the
resulting lights, it will indeed seem that causal dependence can “come apart”
from conditional evidential dependence, even when the latter is assessed from
the agent’s point of view.
The significance of this loophole should not be exaggerated, however. For
one thing, it would not help in the face of a genuine medical Newcomb problem,
where it would be implausible to maintain that the notion of causal dependence
was under any sort of conceptual pressure. For another thing, EviCausalism is
committed to an “in principle” claim of a weaker sort, even in strange cases. If
causal dependence and conditional evidential dependence are allowed to part
company in this way – if causation’s other conceptual ties are judged to be
more worth preserving, in strange cases – the EviCausalist wants to maintain
that it should be nevertheless clear, at least when all the cards are on the table,
that rationality goes with conditional evidential dependence, rather than with
causal dependence. In other words, it should be clear that if causation is taken
this way, such cases provide counterexamples to CDT.
So EviCausalism has some work to do, and I want to suggest a line of
attack. It relies on a feature of the landscape where CDT and EDT already
find common ground, in the thought that in certain cases, Evidentialists will
25Thus Michael Dummett (1954, 32ff.), though defending the conceptual possibility of circum-
stances that would support deliberation for past ends, argues that these would be cases of “quasi-
causation”, rather than genuine causation. (The principle he thereby preserves is that remote causes
should begin a process that leads to their effects.) Dummett’s terminological choice illustrates the
present point very nicely. The fact that he takes quasi-causation to support means–end reasoning
makes it clear that in his view, rational decision does not cleave strictly to causal dependence, in
unusual cases of this kind.
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actually do better than Causalists. This is the basis of the famous Why Ain’t You
Rich? argument against two-boxing. What will be important for my argument
will be that the EviCausalist and her opponent will agree about when EDT
leads to greater riches (i.e., higher expected V-utility) than CDT, under certain
specified circumstances (namely, that it is a random matter which decision
policy an agent follows).
Agreement on this matter means that we have a criterion acceptable to both
sides for dividing Newcomb-like decision problems into two kinds of cases. In
one kind of case, where randomly-assigned Evidentialism does lead to riches,
EviCausalism will be able to appeal to a novel response to the Causalist’s usual
objection to the Why Ain’t You Rich? argument, to argue that in these cases it is
irrational not to follow the Evidential policy, even if one prefers for other reasons
not to label the case in question as one of genuine “causal” dependence. In the
other kind of case, where randomly-assigned Evidentialism does not lead to
riches, the EviCausalist will be able to argue that there is no agentive evidential
dependence, in the relevant sense; and hence that her own version of EDT does
not differ from CDT, with causation standardly understood.
If this argument works, it provides both the insurance the EviCausalist seeks
about the non-existence of “realistic” medical Newcomb problems, and support
for her claim that rationality goes with EDT, even if causation is understood in
such a way that EDT and CDT diverge, in “unrealistic” cases. So first, then, to
the EviCausalist’s response to the Causalist’s objection to Why Ain’t You Rich?,
in the classic Newcomb case.
7 We’re all Causalists now
As we saw in §4.1, the standard Causalist response to the Why Ain’t You Rich? ar-
gument goes something like this: “Sure, one-boxer, you’re rich. But if you had
two-boxed in those same games, you would have been even richer.” To quote
Joyce (1999, 153) once more, “[t]he ‘If you’re so smart why ain’t you rich?’ de-
fense does nothing to let [the one-boxer] off the hook; she made an irrational
choice that cost her $1,000.”
However, unlike a traditional Evidentialist, who accepts the Causalist’s
conception of the modal landscape, my EviCausalist will simply deny that “she
would have gotten [the million] whatever she did.” On the contrary, as she
understands the counterfactuals – regular causal counterfactuals, as she sees
them, not backtrackers26 – she would have received only $1,000, had she two-
boxed. It is the two-boxer who is irrational in this counterfactual sense, by the
EviCausalist’s lights: had the two-boxer one-boxed instead, she would have
had the million.
At this point, a lively discussion is likely to ensue about who has the
“proper” notions of causation and counterfactual dependence. But as we have
26This is how this line differs from that of Horgan (1981). As Horgan puts it, “I do recommend
acting as if one’s present choice could causally influence the being’s prior prediction, but my
argument does not presuppose backward causation.” (1981, 340–341)
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already seen, the EviCausalist is prepared for this. “Keep your notions of cau-
sation and counterfactual dependence, if you wish,” she says to her traditional
Causalist opponents:
“But recognise, with me, how we came to the present juncture, where
we need to make a choice. In the case of chance, a ‘supernatural’ source
of information about the future (i.e., a source not envisaged by our usual
physical theories) would confront us with a choice about how to continue to
use the notion of chance: we could hold fixed our notion of chance, and deal
with the unusual cases by allowing an exception to the Principal Principle;
or we could modify our notion of chance, and preserve the universality of
the Principal Principle. But whichever we choose, it is clear that it makes no
difference to rational betting behaviour. Either way, we should not ignore
the new information – that’s why the first choice requires an exception to
the Principal Principle, after all. The only wrong option is the choice that
muddles and mixes the two right options, by holding fixed the standard
notion of chance, and insisting on the universality of the Principal Principle.
Similarly for causation. We can imagine cases – the traditional New-
comb problem is one – which confront us with a choice about how to
continue to use the notions of causation and counterfactual dependence.
Again, we have two choices. We can hold fixed the traditional notions of
causation and counterfactual dependence, and allow exceptions to CDT
(which is the analogue, here, of the Principal Principle); or we can pre-
serve the universality of CDT, by allowing that the causal structure of these
strange cases is not what initially we took it to be. Again, this choice makes
no difference to the rational behaviour in such a case: either way, it is to
one-box. The only wrong option is the choice that muddles and mixes the
two right options, by holding fixed the standard notion of causation, and
insisting on the universality of CDT.”
The traditional Causalist will want to disagree rather vigorously at this
point, of course. She will want to defend this “mixed” option – and to deny
that it involves any sort of “muddle”! To do so, she needs to explain the relevance
of causality, as she understands it, to rational strategic deliberation. To see what
is at issue here, it is helpful, once again, to compare the analogous problem in
the case of chance.
7.1 The limits of objectivism
Some philosophers feel that there is a problem about explaining the link be-
tween beliefs about objective probabilities and rational credence, of the kind
encapsulated in the Principal Principle. David Papineau, for example, calls this
connection the “Decision-Theoretical Link”:
We base rational choices on our knowledge of objective probabilities. In
any chancy situation, a rational agent will consider the difference that alter-
native actions would make to the objective probabilities of desired results,
and then opt for that action which maximizes objective expected utility.
(1996, 238)
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“Perhaps surprisingly,” Papineau continues, “conventional thought provides
no agreed further justification [for this principle]”:
Note in this connection that what agents want from their choices are de-
sired results, rather than results which are objectively probable (a choice
that makes the results objectively probable, but unluckily doesn’t produce
them, doesn’t give you what you want). This means that there is room to
ask: why are rational agents well advised to choose actions that make their
desired results objectively probable? However, there is no good answer
to this question . . . . Indeed many philosophers in this area now simply
take it to be a primitive fact that you ought to weight future possibilities
according to known objective probabilities in making rational decisions. . . .
It is not just that philosophers can’t agree on the right justification; many
have concluded that there simply isn’t one. (1996, 238)
Not all views of probability will agree with Papineau that there is any
such a problem, however. One tradition, variously known as subjectivism,
pragmatism, or Bayesianism, regards it as a pseudo-problem, generated, in effect,
by starting one’s account of probability in the wrong place. Provided we start
with the insight that probabilistic models are guides to decision-making under
uncertainty in particular domains, there’s no further mystery as to why they
may be used for that purpose. There is no primitive assumption needed, and
no decision-theoretical Missing Link. There may be other interesting questions
in the vicinity: e.g., about how, and why, such probabilistic models are linked to
other kinds of models, such as those provided by physics in various domains;
and about whether these links uniquely constrain the associated probabilistic
models. But these are not the practical puzzle about why probability properly
guides action. That isn’t a puzzle at all, from the subjectivist point of view.
Another interesting issue, famously explored in Lewis’s own account of
chance, is the extent to which this subjectivist insight can be combined with
an objectivist, or metaphysically realist, theory of chance. As we noted at the
beginning, Lewis thought that it could be. In his account the tie to subjectivism
consists in the fact that it is definitional of objective chances that they support
the Principal Principle. If something doesn’t do that, it isn’t properly called
chance. “A feature of Reality deserves the name of chance to the extent that it
occupies the definitive role of chance,” as Lewis (1994, 489) puts it.
But consider a view of chance of the kind Papineau has in mind, prepared
to take it to be a primitive fact, needing no justification, that chance constrains
rational credence in the manner described by the Principal Principle. We can
imagine that such a view – emboldened by its own courage in making a stand
on this point – might also dig in its heels concerning the rationality of betting
Heads, in the first version of our Chewcomb game, despite the availability of
inadmissible evidence. “To hell with Satan,” says this Mad-Dog Objectivist,
thumping the table. “By betting Tails, you irrationally forgo an equal chance of
a greater reward.” Or in the past tense: “No matter that you actually won; you
were nevertheless irrational, because you sacrificed an equal chance of a greater
reward.” Or in the long run: “No matter that you have won many times, and
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are now rich; and that I, betting on Heads, am not rich. This is not a mark of
irrationality on my part, but merely a sign that the rewards were reserved for
the irrational.”
I am not sure whether anyone actually thumps the table to this dialectical
end, in the case of chance. But many people, including Lewis, staunchly defend
what I take to be its analogue in the case of causation: that is, orthodox two-
boxing. The full set of analogies is depicted in Table 7. On the right hand
side are views that take modal beliefs to constrain practical rationality, even in
cases of exceptional evidence. On the left hand side are views that construe
practical rationality in evidential terms; typically combining this preference
with some element of subjectivism about the associated modal judgements. In
the middle are mixed positions, that allow that there may be exceptional cases
in which evidence and objective modality part company, and in which practical
rationality goes with the former. Lewis himself holds the mixed view in the
case of chance, but the full modal priority view in the case of causation – and
the combination creates internal difficulties, as we have already seen.27
Evidential priority Modal priority
with exceptions
Modal priority
Chance Hall Lewis The table-thumper
Causation EviCausalists Horgan, Horwich Two-boxers
Table 7: Three views of practical rationality.
Is my comparison of the orthodox two-boxer position to table-thumping
objectivism about chance a fair one, or can causal objectivism do better than
its probabilistic cousin? Can the causal objectivist justify (rather than simply
assume as primitive) the claimed link between causal judgement and rational
decision (and hence explain why the objective modality takes precedence, in
case of conflict with exceptional evidence)?
What does the history of these debates tell us about the prospects for such an
argument? It reveals a widespread acceptance, even on the part of two-boxers
themselves, that there is no such argument to be found. As we noted earlier,
Lewis himself says that the debate is “hopelessly deadlocked,” (1981a, 5) and
“a standoff.” (1981b, 378)
Hopeless deadlock will be bad enough for present purposes, but I note
in passing that Horgan (1981) argues persuasively for an even less promis-
ing conclusion, from the two-boxers’ point of view. He notes an apparently
ineliminable circularity in their attempt to justify two-boxing, turning on the
fact that attempts at justification always return to the same kind of counter-
factuals. One-boxers do better, Horgan argues, by confining their attention to
27The most important distinction here is the one marked by the double line. To the left of this
line, evidence rules rationality, and modality plays a vice-regal role. (Evidence is the throne behind
the powers, so to speak.) To the right of the this line, modality rule rationality, and evidence defers.
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deliberation about actuality.28
Why is even deadlock bad news, from a two-boxer’s point of view? For a
reason which Lewis himself puts his finger on, with respect to “unHumean”
theories of chance, whose proponents are more willing than he himself is to
postulate metaphysical primitives:
Be my guest—posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you like. . . .
But play fair in naming your whatnots. Don’t call any alleged feature of
reality “chance” unless you’ve already shown that you have something,
knowledge of which could constrain rational credence. I think I see, dimly
but well enough, how knowledge of frequencies and symmetries and best
systems could constrain rational credence. I don’t begin to see, for instance,
how knowledge that two universals stand in a certain special relation N*
could constrain rational credence about the future coinstantiation of those
universals. (1994, 484)
My EviCausalist makes the same demand of an account of causation:
Be my guest – posit all the primitive whatnots you like. But play fair in nam-
ing your whatnots. Don’t call any alleged feature of reality “causation”, or
“counterfactual dependence”, unless you’ve already shown that you have
something, knowledge of which could constrain rational deliberation.29
Had Lewis himself been in a position to meet this challenge to his own account
of causation and counterfactuals, he would have had the key required to break
the deadlock between one-boxers and two-boxers. The fact that he thought the
deadlock hopeless therefore supports my contention that two-boxers occupy a
position analogous to that of hardline primitivist objectivists about chance – a
further manifestation, in my view, of a deep tension in Lewis’s own view.
EviCausalism, by contrast, has precisely the advantages of Lewis’s own
subjectivism in the case of probability. By building its account of causality
on deliberation, evidentially construed, it ensures that causality does not lose
conceptual or practical touch with deliberation.
The Principal Principle can be regarded as a codification of the relation that
something must bear to credence, to count as chance, or objective probability.
As we might put it:
SDTch = SDTev + PP.
In other words, PP is the rationality condition one needs to add to SDTev, to
produce the “bundled”, two-experts-in-one theory represented by SDTch.
28Cf. Price & Weslake (2009), who note that Lewis’s “deadlock” reflects the difficulty that accounts
of counterfactuals such as Lewis’s have in explaining the connection between counterfactuals
and deliberation. Like Horgan, Price & Weslake argue that we do better if we begin with non-
counterfactual modes of deliberation – with “material deliberation”, as they term it.
29Is this demand is compatible with the concessive policy I have recommended earlier, viz., that
of allowing alternate choices about the use of these concepts in exceptional cases, provided it is
conceded (as Lewis himself concedes for chance in cases of inadmissible evidence) that the usual
ties with rational action are broken in these cases? Yes, provided we read the demand as calling
only for an explanation of the concepts’ connection with rational action in normal cases. (Lewis
must take it this way in the case of chance, of course, if his own view is not to fail the test.)
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In the same spirit, the EviCausalist proposes that we should expect a codifi-
cation of the relation that something must bear to conditional agentive credence,
to count as causality – in other words, a rationality condition one needs to add
to EDT to produce CDT (which is the two-experts-in-one version of conditional
decision theory). What is this principle CP, such that
CDT = EDT + CP?
Essentially, it is the principle that in assessing one’s agentive conditional cre-
dences for Outcomes given Acts, one should be guided by one’s causal beliefs.
8 Random riches
Now to the task deferred above: using Why Ain’t you Rich? as a point of
agreement between EviCausalism and traditional Causalism, in order to argue
that EviCausalism is as general as it needs to be – there are no nasty surprises,
lurking around the corner.
In the standard Newcomb problem, two-boxers accept that one-boxers will
get rich, and that they themselves will not. But the bare description of the case
admits a variety of understandings of what actually underlies the prediction.
In order to mark what will turn out to be an important distinction, I want to
introduce the following variant. Let us suppose that it is proposed to allocate
agents randomly to a one-boxer stream or a two-boxer stream (perhaps with
an additional inducement, so that all parties agree that it is rational to play
the game). The function of randomness here is to guarantee that agents are
epistemically neutral between the two options,30 and we therefore stipulate
that the device makes the two streams equally likely.
Will Causalists and Evidentialists still agree that the expected return (i.e.,
the expected V-utility) for the one-box stream is much greater than for the
two-box stream? For present purposes I shall assume that they will. (Imagine
that they think the Predictor is a seer, who knows the agent’s choice, even if
it is the result of our random process.) Nothing controversial hangs on this
assumption: I simply need an example that falls on this side of the line, and it
won’t matter that it is highly unrealistic. In fact, the more realistic we attempt
to make the classic Newcomb problem – by not-too-implausible extrapolation
from the predictive powers of real predictors, perhaps – the less likely it is
that the assumed correlation between one-boxing and wealth will still obtain
in this case. Not-too-implausible predictors will fail dismally when the task
is to predict random choices. For present purposes, however, we are simply
exploring the options, as they seem from the EviCausalist’s perspective. It
will do no harm to assume a very unrealistic version of the classic Newcomb
problem, to illustrate one of these options.
In the medical cases, presumably, Causalists take a different view. They
will not expect that agents randomly assigned to the No Smoking stream will
30As we shall see in a moment (§8.1), it thus simulates something that is true anyway, from the
agent’s perspective.
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have a lower incidence of the cancer gene than those assigned to the Smoking
stream. If they themselves are the players in this random game, then their own
conditional credences of having the gene, conditional on being assigned to the
No Smoking stream or to the Smoking stream, are identical. By the Causalist’s
lights, in other words, there is no Why Ain’t you Rich? challenge to be answered
in this case: those randomly assigned to decline a cigarette will be no “richer”
(i.e., healthier) on average than those who do not. On average, they will be
worse off, once the denied pleasure of smoking is taken into account.
Somewhere between these two cases thus lies a boundary, by a regular
Causalist’s lights. On one side of the line, a randomly prescribed “Evidentialist”
choice leads to higher expected V-utilility. On the other side, it does not.31 So
long as EviCausalism can cleave to this same line, recommending only the
choices that have higher expected V-utility in this random game, then when
it differs from traditional Causalism, it will always be able to appeal to Why
Ain’t you Rich? (with the response outlined above in hand, to deal with the
Causalist’s objections).
The EviCausalist thus requires that her own agentive conditional probabil-
ities of Outcomes given Acts (e.g., of Cancer given Smoking, in the Smoking
Gene example) are the same as the corresponding conditional probabilities in
the random case. So long as this equality holds, the EviCausalist will assign
the same expected V-utilities to Acts in the two cases – that is to say, when she
chooses the Act, and when the random device chooses the Act. Accordingly,
her own decision policy will recommend a particular Act if and only if the
Causalist agrees that that Act maximises V-utility in the random game.
So the EviCausalist needs to show that she is entitled to ignore any apparent
evidential dependency that wouldn’t hold if her action were randomly chosen.
How might this result be established? The most direct option would be to
maintain that it is simply a primitive, constitutive fact about the free agent’s point
of view that she regards her actions as “uncaused”, in such a way that she is
automatically committed to the claim that any evidential dependency between
her Actions and Outcomes would survive if her actions were randomly chosen
(this being simply one way in which her choices may be uncaused). Such a
view of free action (without the claim that it is primitive) is proposed by Price,
who attributes it to Ramsey:
Ramsey [identifies] what he takes to be the crux of the agent’s perspective,
namely the fact that from the agent’s point of view contemplated actions
are always considered to be sui generis, uncaused by external factors. As
he puts it, “my present action is an ultimate and the only ultimate con-
tingency.” [Ramsey 1978, 146] I think this amounts to the view that free
actions are treated as probabilistically independent of everything except
their effects.32 (1993, 261)
31As we observed a moment ago, semi-realistic versions of the original Newcomb problem will
fall on the latter side of the divide.
32Price goes on to suggest that this point be read “in reverse”, so that we regard the effects of
an action, as the EviCausalist here proposes, as those outcomes properly regard as (positively)
conditionally probabilistically dependent on the action, in the context of deliberation.
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Similar views are defended by Hitchcock (1996) and Joyce (2007). Hitchcock’s
version perhaps comes closest to regarding this as simply a primitive feature
of free action: he suggests that we might regard it as a kind of “fiction”, central
to our practice of regarding ourselves as free agents.
Can we do better than regarding this as a primitive feature of agency, fic-
tional or not? The Tickle Defence and its descendants comprise a sustained
attempt to do better; to show that an agent’s evidential perspective is guaran-
teed to have this distinctive character, in virtue of differences between her own
epistemic situation and that of external observers. As we noted in §6 above, the
core of the Tickle Defence is the thought that an agent’s special epistemic access
to her own beliefs and desires inevitably screens off, for her, the evidential rele-
vance of any prior factors, such as the Smoking Gene, that might be correlated
with her choice. If the argument works, it provides a kind of case-by-case de-
feater for evidential connections that would otherwise make her actions unlike
randomly chosen actions (in being correlated with such prior states of affairs).
As we have already seen, Lewis himself offered an optimistic assessment
of the prospect for this endeavour. In this context, where the task is provide
EviCausalism with a guarantee that there are no cases in which her own policy
need differ from that of the random game, we need not be concerned about
Lewis’s remarks about the unsuitability of the Tickle Defence for imperfectly
rational agents (where, as Lewis put it in the remark we quoted in §6.1, “ratio-
nality is taken to include self-knowledge.”)33 All the same, I think there is a
sense in which the Tickle Defence puts the emphasis in the wrong place, and
misses a more elegant and economical route to the de facto randomness that the
EviCausalist requires. This route also turns on the special epistemic perspective
of a deliberating agent, but in a less piecemeal manner.
8.1 The epistemics of deliberation
The new argument turns on the special epistemic authority of an agent’s de-
liberations concerning her own actions. One recent writer who calls attention
to this authority, and notes its potential to offer an alternative to the Tickle
Defence, is Joyce (2007). Joyce himself takes the crucial point to be that “an
agent’s beliefs about her own free decisions and actions provide evidence for
their own truth.” (2007, 558) Such beliefs are “self-supporting”, as he puts it.34
An alternative way to put this thought, preferable in my view, is to say that
there is an important sense in which, as she deliberates, an agent simply does
not have knowledge, beliefs or credences about the action in question. In this
33Though Lewis’s caution about the coherence of free choice for a perfectly rational agent might
lend support to fictionalism after all.
34Joyce makes these points in order to block an objection from Richard Jeffrey, to the effect that
Newcomb problems are not really cases of free choice at all, because the agents involved know too
much about their own actions. Joyce is thus defending Causalism against an Evidentialist objection.
In my view, however, the point ultimately counts in favour of Evidentialism, by showing how the
Evidentialist can justifiably ignore spurious evidential correlations: they fall into the category of
evidence properly ignored by the deliberating agent.
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form, Joyce’s thought corresponds to a familiar view, nicely characterised by
Wlodek Rabinowicz in the following passage:35
On this view, the relevant distinction is between the first-person perspective
of a practical deliberator and the third-person perspective of an observer.
While the observer can predict what I will do, I can’t, insofar as I deliberate
upon what is to be done. Deliberating in this way is incompatible with
predicting the outcome of deliberation. To put it shortly, deliberation crowds
out prediction. (Rabinowicz 2002, 91)
One route to this thesis, as to Joyce’s version, turns on the special epistemic
authority of the deliberating agent, concerning her own actions. This authority
“trumps” any merely predictive knowledge claim about the same matters,
rendering it necessarily unjustified.
A familiar application and illustration of this point, in a superficially differ-
ent guise, is Dummett’s (1964) observation that an agent can coherently believe
that she can affect some past state of affairs only if she takes herself to be un-
able to know whether the state of affairs in question obtains, before she decides
whether to perform the action she takes to be required to bring it about. Given
retrocausality, any claimed knowledge about this matter could be “bilked,” as
the familiar argument has it – that is, the agent could choose to act so as to
defeat the knowledge claim in question.36 Dummett’s point applies equally to
effects in any temporal relation to actions, of course. It is especially striking in
the retrocausal case only because we typically assume that we do have epis-
temic access, at least in principle, to states of affairs in the past. In the usual
future-directed case, the presumption goes the other way. We assume that we
do not have epistemic access, in advance, to the future effects of contemplated
actions, or to the actions themselves. But again, if it were claimed that we
did have such access, the claim could be bilked. The bilking argument simply
reminds us that the agent herself holds the epistemic trump card. And Joyce’s
point – already implicit, I think, in Dummett’s discussion – is that the character
of deliberation mandates this assumption.
What is the source of this special epistemic authority of the deliberating
agent concerning her own actions? The most general proposal I know is that
of Jenann Ismael, who argues that it is simply a special case of a familiar
form of “epistemic degeneracy”, as Ismael calls it, typical of self-representing
representations:
Alethic constraints . . . on representational activity are empty when applied
reflexively, i.e., when what is being represented is the representational act
itself. The most familiar examples of this degeneracy are self-representing
linguistic performances: “I promise to X”, “I declare that Y”. Such perfor-
mances are perfectly good representational acts. They have truth conditions
35Rabinowicz himself opposes this view, which he attributes particularly to Spohn and Levi.
36The bilking argument is more familiar with the opposite orientation, pointing out that given
such knowledge, the claim of retrocausal influence could be bilked. But it cuts equally well in
either direction.
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that can fail to obtain; someone else can certainly falsely ascribe a promise
to me, and I can misrepresent my own past promises and declarations. But
because they provide their own truthmakers, they are unconstrained at the
time that they are made. They are self-fulfilling. . . .
[This] degeneracy is unavoidable for any system that includes its own activ-
ity in the field of representation. The desire to tell the truth in general will
not guide my answer the question “Will I A?” and the ordinary epistemic
procedures for getting information about whether [someone] A’d will not
apply. Guidance has to come from elsewhere. . . .
The emptiness, or degeneracy of alethic constraints . . . when applied to
one’s own actions opens up the space for deliberation. I believe that it
captures the sense in which, from the point of view of the participant in a
dynamical process, her own actions have the status of what Ramsey called
“an ultimate contingency”. (Ismael 2007, §3)
As Ismael remarks, the epistemic authority of deliberation seems to explain
the striking feature of action noted by Ramsey, viz., its apparent “contingency,”
from the agent’s point of view. Once again, the point is easily made by adapting
Dummett’s condition for the coherence of a belief in retrocausality. An agent
who took her own future actions to be caused by an earlier state of affairs of
which she had knowledge, before she made up her mind what to do, would be
in exactly the same incoherent epistemic position as Dummett’s agent, who took
herself to have knowledge of the past effects of a future action. (The difference
between the two cases is simply the direction of the causal link, which makes no
difference to what matters here, namely, the evidential significance of the link in
question.) A little more generally, this argument shows that as she deliberates,
a free agent cannot take her action to be correlated with anything of which she
might in principle have knowledge, before she makes up her mind what to do.
Again, any such correlation could be bilked.
8.2 Discussion
This appeal to the special epistemic situation of a deliberating agent provides
much of what EviCausalism needs. It offers a strong argument, grounded
on what is arguably an essential feature of deliberation, that many evidential
correlations are properly ignored from a deliberating agent’s point of view.
But does it go far enough? Couldn’t there be some non-causal correlation
between an agent’s actions and some state of affairs of which she could not have
knowledge, even in principle, as she deliberates? The epistemic inaccessibility
of the state of affairs in question would then enable to correlation to survive
under deliberation, from the agent’s point of view, precisely as in Dummett’s
examples of coherent conceptions of retrocausality. But if it is not really a causal
correlation, isn’t the EviCausalist still in trouble?
The EviCausalist will agree that such cases are possible by the traditional
Causalist’s lights, but deny that they are possible by her own lights. On the
contrary, she insists, such a correlation would automatically count as causal,
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by her standards. That’s what causal dependency is, by her lights, after all:
evidential dependency conditional on Acts, from the rational agent’s point of
view.
Moreover, since the correlation in question survives (by assumption) under
deliberation, it survives in particular in the random choice case (which is simply
a special case of deliberation, a choice to be guided by the outcome of a random
event); which means that the traditional Causalist will have to admit that it
leads to riches, when linked to suitable Outcomes. So it falls on the right side
of the line, by the EviCausalist’s lights. (It is in the same basket as the classic
Newcomb problem, in other words, in the strong version we assumed in the
first paragraphs of this section; see p. 32 above.)
If this argument works, it gives EviCausalism a guarantee that the condi-
tional credences to which its version of EDT appeals yield the same assessments
of expected V-utility as in the random game. From this point, the argument
is straightforward. On one side, with the (strong version of the) classic New-
comb problem, EviCausalism recommends one-boxing, responding to the two-
boxer’s objection to Why Ain’t you Rich? in the way described, and challenging
traditional Causalists to offer a non-question-begging defence of the rationality
of their own policy. On the other side, where the familiar medical problems lie,
EviCausalism recommends “two-boxing” – i.e., the same choice as traditional
CDT.
In both cases, the EviCausalist stresses that by her lights – according to her
understanding of causality, and her view of the probabilities required by EDT –
CDT and EDT actually coincide. She recognises that traditional Causalists
understand the term “causation” somewhat differently, and hence that by their
lights, the cases in which EviCausalism recommends one-boxing are cases in
which CDT differs from EDT. Her challenge to these opponents is to defend the
claim that CDT remains rational, in these exceptional cases, if “causation” is
understood as they prefer. To meet this challenge, traditional Causalists need
a response to the Why Ain’t you Rich? objection – but now in the hands of an
opponent who, unlike meeker traditional Evidentialists, is not prepared simply
to concede the Causalist her counterfactuals.37
9 Conclusion
We have covered a lot of ground. I close with a summary of the main points,
and some remarks about the limits of the present conclusions.
9.1 Summary
(i) The Chewcomb problems reveal a significant tension in a popular combi-
nation of views (a combination exemplified by Lewis himself, amongst others)
37Not, at least, until the Causalist concedes that counterfactuals need not guide rationality, in
exceptional cases.
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concerning the rational practical significance of exceptional evidence, in the
case of chance on the one hand, and causation on the other.
(iii) The tension can be resolved by adopting the same degree of subjectivism
with respect to causation38 that Lewis adopts with respect to chance – accepting
that causation, too, has its roots in evidential decision making, at least in the
sense that nothing deserves the name causation, unless we can explain its
relevance to decision. For causation as for chance, the required degree of
subjectivism is nicely captured by the proposal that the modal notion in a
question is an expert, intended to represent ideal evidential practice.
(iv) As in the case of chance, there are two ways to develop this thought, which
differ in their treatment of certain cases of exceptional evidence. For Lewis,
chance is not an infallible expert, and is rationally set aside by someone who
believes herself to have inadmissible evidence. For Hall, there can be no such
cases: no evidence is inadmissible, from chance’s point of view. The difference
is largely a matter of taste, and the two views agree about the rational credences,
in the exceptional cases. Similarly in the case of causation, in circumstances
such as the classic Newcomb problem. The Hall-like view treats these as cases
in which the causal structure is abnormal (e.g., in involving retrocausality). The
Lewis-like view treats them as cases in which rational choice does not follow
CDT. But the two views agree on the rational policy: it is to one-box.
(v) If we go Hall’s way in the case of causation – the EviCausalist proposal,
as I have called it – then EDT and CDT now coincide everywhere. But this
does not imply that CDT need endorse the equivalent of one-boxing (i.e., not
smoking, in the Smoking Gene problem) in medical cases. There, someone
who believes that EDT recommends one-boxing is simply someone confused
about the proper evidential bearing of her actions, as she deliberates. In normal
cases, in which the causal structure is uncontroversial, our knowledge about it
provides our best protection against such confusion; causation being precisely
the expert we need to consult, in order to get these evidential judgements right.
(vi) This alignment between CDT and EDT entails that the usual Causalist
response to Why ain’t you rich? is powerless. Unlike conventional Evidentialists,
the EviCausalist rejects the Causalist’s claims about the relevant counterfactuals
(insisting that had she two-boxed, she would have been nearly $1,000,000
poorer, not $1,000 richer, in the strong version of the classic Newcomb problem).
(vii) At this point, the traditional Causalist will wish to defend her own reading
of the counterfactuals, in the form of some objectivist rival to the EviCausalist’s
account of causal dependence. But such views are vulnerable to the charge
that Lewis himself makes against analogous views of chance: what they offer
38Or better, perhaps, the concept of causation. As noted in §2, I have been setting aside this
distinction, in order to get on the table the main argument and the analogy with chance on which
it relies. But the analogy holds here, too, in my view, and it is appropriate to ask whether Lewis’s
subjectivism is best thought of as an account of chance itself, or rather as an account of the concept
of chance. I myself favour the latter reading, but shall not argue the point here.
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us does not deserve the name causation, unless the Causalist can explain its
relevance to rational deliberation. (And if the Causalist could do that, she
would already have a response to the EviCausalist.)
(viii) Viewed by these lights, the original Newcomb problem is pathology of
rational deliberation, induced, to a significant degree, by excessive objectivism
about causality. By obscuring the practical foundations of causal thought,
this objectivism makes it hard to see that the Newcomb puzzle presents us with
what amounts to conflicting information about the causal structure of a decision
problem. On the one hand we are told, or simply infer by normal standards,
that the agent’s choice does not affect the contents of the opaque box. How
could it do so, we are expected to think, if the money has been there (or not)
since some time in the past? (Normal standards exclude retrocausality.) On
the other hand we are given information about evidential dependence, which,
combined with the assumption that we do genuinely have a choice, leads us by
different normal standards to the conclusion that we can affect the contents of
the opaque box – it is in our gift, as it were. Objectivism obscures the fact that
we have a clash between two normal criteria for causality, not a clash between
criteria for causality and something else entirely.
(ix) Once seen in the former terms, as a clash between two criteria for causality,
the puzzle’s intractability is easier to understand: our causal intuitions are
simply pulling us in two different directions, because the two criteria conflict.
As in other cases of conceptual conflict, we then have a choice to make, about
how to use the disputed notion in these strange circumstances. We can certainly
choose to privilege the non-evidential factors, if we wish. (Again, see fn. 25
for an example of such a terminological choice.) But in that case we have no
good grounds to insist that causality always constrains rational action. The
circumstances driving the need for a terminological choice are sufficient to call
that link into question; and, by choosing to be guided instead by the practical
criteria, the EviCausalist automatically has the upper hand in the resulting
dispute.
(x) A secondary contributing factor to the power and longevity of Newcomb’s
puzzle, if this diagnosis is correct, is the subtlety of the special epistemic status
of the deliberating agent, as needed to ground an adequate subjectivist view
of causation, immune from these illusions. The rough shape of the terrain is
relatively familiar, the key feature being that fact that deliberation “crowds out”
prediction, as we put it earlier. But a detailed elucidation of this idea, in a well
worked-out model of the epistemic dynamics of deliberation, remains a work
in progress.
9.2 Limitations
I want to emphasise, first, that I am not proposing that EviCausalism offers a
one-stop solution to all decision puzzles in the Newcomb tradition. The align-
ment EviCausalism allows between causal dependency and agentive evidential
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dependency does not imply, by any means, that it will always easy to determine
what these dependencies are, in a particular decision problem. EviCausalism
tells us that they lie in the same place, but not in which place – and that, of
course, can still be hard to determine.
Among the hard cases we should expect various variants of the classic
Newcomb problem. As I noted (§8, p. 34), I have been taking for granted that
the classic version of the problem is one in which Evidentialism really does
recommend one-boxing. But as I also noted, it is easy to construct variants
(based, e.g., on not-too-improbable extrapolations from the capacities of real
predictors) that lie on the other side of the line – in those cases, as in the
medical cases, I take it that Evidentialism properly recommends two-boxing.
In between, we may well find subtle cases which are hard to classify. Random
experimentation remains the best guide, but it is not foolproof. We can never be
certain that we have genuine randomness, for there might always be a lurking
common cause, of which we are unaware. Nor can we be sure that the random
mechanism itself does not have perturbing effects.39 No matter – we inch our
way forward, as in science in general, prepared always to retreat if necessary.
The difference that EviCausalism makes is simply that as we do so, causal
dependence and agentive evidential dependence keep step. Hypotheses about
one are hypotheses about the other.
A related difficulty which survives EviCausalism is that it may be unclear
whether a proposed decision problem is really a decision problem at all – that
is, do its constraints really allow us to regard ourselves as making a choice?
Here EviCausalism presumably has some bearing, for it reduces the potential
parameters of a decision problem in a new way. But it seems unlikely to
eliminate such puzzles altogether. As an extreme example, think of the variant
of the classic Newcomb problem in which both boxes are transparent. Can an
agent believe the usual story about the evidential significance of one-boxing,
and yet believe that she has a choice in the matter? For a EviCausalist this is the
same puzzle as a claimed case of causation in which the effect of a contemplated
action is known in advance. But reducing two puzzles to one is not the same
as eliminating them altogether.
This question connects with one which is both deeper and broader, and
raises potential challenges to EviCausalism, that of the status of agency itself.
As we have seen, the EviCausalist relies heavily on the idea that the epistemic
viewpoint of an agent is distinctive in certain ways. Roughly, it requires that
agents see their own actions as “uncaused,” at least in the midst of deliberation
about those same actions. This not only binds the fate of the EviCausalist, at
least in some sense, to that of free will. It also means, potentially even more
uncomfortably, that EviCausalism becomes a rope that binds causation to the
fate of free will – no problem, perhaps, if these notions turn out to share the
same fate, but a problem if they do not.
EviCausalism thus has a stake in some large issues about the metaphysics
39As it does in Nozick’s own presentation of the original case, in which the Predictor penalizes
agents who choose by random means.
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of causation, and related matters. And these issues in turn raise some general
questions, of interest on all sides, which relate to our strategy of comparing
chance and causation. Why has subjectivism seemed less attractive in the
case of causation than in case of chance, for example? And is the difference
well-grounded?
So various philosophical puzzles remain, in the vicinity of the Newcomb
problem, even if we accept the EviCausalist proposal. Nevertheless, EviCausal-
ism offers a solution to the central puzzle of the case: it mends, and ends, the
strange divergence of causation and evidence that lies at the conflicted heart of
Newcomb’s famous problem. And it brings an attractive unity to chance and
causation, extending the pragmatism of Lewis’s treatment of the former to a
treatment of the latter. It would be pleasing if it were true.
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